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THE IMPORTANCE OF "BEING TAKEN": TO CLARIFY 
AND CONFIRM THE LITIGATIVE RECONSTRUCTION 
OF CERCLA'S TEXT 
Alfred R. Light* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since its original enactment in 1980, the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or 
Superfund)1 has focused scholarly attention on the litigation process 
and the related policy concerns of economy and efficiency. 2 Critics 
complain about the inordinate transaction costs of using litigation as 
the principal means for remedying abandoned hazardous waste 
sites.3 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its lawyers 
at the Department of Justice (DOJ) have sought to minimize their 
costs and to maximize efficiency in reimbursement and administra-
tion of the Superfund.4 To achieve this objective in the long run, 
• Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University. B.A. 1971, Johns Hopkins University; 
Ph.D. 1976, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1981, Harvard Law School. 
1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 
(1988». The statute creates the Hazardous Substance Superfund, a trust fund fueled by taxes 
on the oil and petrochemical industries, corporations, and general revenues, to be used to 
clean up releases of hazardous substances into the environment. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4612, 
4661-4662, 9507 (1988). 
2 See, e.g., Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Tons, in CAUSATION AND FINANCIAL 
COMPENSATION (Novey ed. 1986); Light, A Defense Counsel's Perspective on Superfund, 15 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,203 (1985). 
3 See Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfund Liability Be Abolished?, 6 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 312-18 (1986-87); 131 CONGo REC. S12,008 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1985) 
(statement of Sen. Domenici). See generally Insurance Issues and Superfund: Hearing on S. 
51 Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 115-
37 (1985) [hereinafter Insurance Hearing] (testimony of John C. Butler IlIon costs of 
CERCLA litigation). 
4 See Insurance Hearing, supra note 3, at 54-72 (the EPA responses to questions of Sen. 
Simpson concerning transaction costs). 
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they have spent considerable resources in the short run in court 
litigation and in legislative lobbying to establish favorable interpre-
tations of the statute. 5 
As described below, the government's6 campaign to obtain favor-
able interpretations of the statute has been successful, probably 
more successful than many in the government imagined at the out-
set. The environmentalist imperative is strong. The hypothesis of 
this Article, however, is that the campaign has achieved an embar-
rassment of riches, a string of successes that go beyond the public 
policies that supposedly underlie those successes. In Lewis Carroll's 
fable of the snark, the sum of all the witnesses' testimony amounted 
to much more than any of the witnesses ever had said. 7 In CERCLA, 
the sum of all the judicial interpretations of specific statutory pro-
visions goes beyond the policies that Congress intended to effectuate 
in the Act. 
Section II of this Article explains the background of the 1986 
amendments to CERCLA and their roots in the EPA's and the DOJ's 
campaign to shape judicial construction of the original 1980 Act. This 
section shows how the government used its preliminary successes in 
Congress during reauthorization, prior to enactment of the amend-
ments, to obtain judicial interpretations favorable to its position. 
Section III explores post-1986 CERCLA litigation on three issues: 
liability, contribution, and judicial review. After passage of the 
amendments, the government continued to use purported legislative 
history of the amendments to "clarify and confirm" positions that it 
has asserted. The government also developed new, more aggressive 
stances in some areas. Section IV explains the sacrifice of CER-
CLA's text in judicial acceptance of the government's more extreme 
5 In Fiscal Year 1985 (FY85), for example, the Department of Justice (DOJ) billed the 
Superfund approximately five million dollars. Insurance Hearing, supra note 3, at 64. During 
that year, the EPA told Congress that it intended to "minimize legal costs" by resolving legal 
questions on: (1) clarification of CERCLA's right of contribution; (2) contribution protection; 
(3) mandatory deferral of contribution claims; (4) preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial review 
and record review; and (5) enhanced settlement authorities. Id. at 70-71. 
6 Throughout this Article, the EPA and its lawyers at the DOJ are referred to collectively 
as the "government." This "person" CERCLA enumerates at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) as "United 
States Government." 
7 L. Carroll, Fit the Sixth: The Barrister's Dream, in C. Dodgson, THE HUMOROUS VERSE 
OF LEWIS CARROLL 298, 299 (1933): 
[d. 
But the Judge said he never had summed up before; 
So the Snark undertook it instead, 
And summed it so well that it came to far more 
Than the witnesses ever had said. 
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interpretations. Certain of these interpretations are inconsistent 
with one another and with the statute's text. Taken together, these 
inconsistent interpretations create a harsh and inequitable statutory 
regime far beyond that sought by CERCLA's most government-
oriented congressional sponsors. Section V concludes that the courts 
are "being taken," a phrase whose symbolic importance compels a 
Supreme Court mid-course correction in interpretation of the Act. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE SUPERFUND REGIME 
A. Pre-CERCLA Hazardous Waste Litigation 
When CERCLA initially was enacted in December, 1980, the DOJ 
had already developed a nationwide coordinated approach to hazard-
ous waste litigation. 8 Through the Hazardous Waste Section of the 
DOJ's Land and Natural Resources Division and an associated task 
force at the EPA, a serious effort to compel cleanups under pre-
existing legal authorities already had achieved considerable success. 9 
The effort's achievements included significant settlements, several 
court rulings expansively interpreting the "imminent hazard" pro-
vision in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),1O 
and a congressional amendment to RCRA generally codifying the 
legal position asserted by the government in the courts to expand 
RCRA's use in cleaning up old dumpsites. 11 
The centralized, coordinated approach to hazardous waste litiga-
tion initiated in the Carter era remained throughout the maligned 
Gorsuch-Burford/Lavelle era at the EPA.12 In fact, the fund-con-
serving instincts of that EPA administration probably enhanced the 
symbolic importance of the DOJ's campaign to obtain a construction 
of the new statute that would make injunctions and cost recovery 
more economical from the government's perspective. 13 
8 See Mintz, Agencies, Congress and Regulatory Enforcement: A Review of EPA's Haz-
ardous Waste Enforcement Effort, 1970-1987, 18 ENVTL. L. 683, 703-05 (1988). 
9 Light & Ledbetter, Process Overdue: The Erosion of Judicial Review Under Superfund, 
34 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 27, 29 (1987). 
10 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988). 
11 United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1138-42 (D. Conn. 1980); 
United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870, 885-86 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Solid Waste 
Disposal Act Amendments of 1980 § 25, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988). 
12 See Mintz, supra note 8, at 703-43. 
13 See UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S EXPERIENCE WITH IMPLEMENTING SUPERFUND 4-
3 to 4-15 (1984) (submitted pursuant to section 301(a)(1) of CERCLA) (50% of cleanups 
expected to be attributable to enforcement first response actions/settlements). 
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By 1986, when CERCLA was amended by the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),14 many federal district 
courts virtually had eliminated the bases upon which defendants 
could resist demands that they immediately undertake or pay for 
the cleanup of hazardous waste sites with which they had some past 
or present association. 15 In these cases, disputes predictably arose 
in three major areas: (1) liability and particularly the extent of 
liability of individual defendants; (2) allocation of equitable respon-
sibility for cleanup tasks or payments among jointly liable persons; 
and (3) the remedy for the site. 16 The government almost always 
pursued a select few among many persons who were potentially 
responsible under the statute for remedying the site. 17 The govern-
ment's ostensible objective was settlement-an agreement with fi-
nancially responsible parties to undertake the remedial action that 
the EPA selected. The government sought to avoid entanglement 
with allocation of responsibilities among the parties agreeing to un-
dertake the cleanup or between the settlors and non-settling poten-
tial defendants. 18 
B. The Initial Litigation Approach Under CERCLA 
To enhance the long-run chances of achieving settlement without 
the burden of apportionment at most Superfund sites, in the mid-
14 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
16 See Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses Left?, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 385 (1988). 
16 Note, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1459 (1986). 
See generally Note, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup, 42 
VAND. L. REV. 1469 (1989). 
17 Light, A Defense Counsel's Perspective on Superfund, supra note 2, at 10,206 & n.20; 
Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste' 
Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1270 (1987). The government maintained to Congress during 
the reauthorization that it sought to represent the "majority of the waste by volume at a site" 
in the defendants it selected to sue. Insurance Hearing, supra note 3, at 6 (statement of F. 
Henry Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, De-
partment of Justice). 
18 See Insurance Hearing, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Gene Lucero, Director, Office 
of Waste Programs Enforcement, EPA). 
Id. 
[W]e conclude that if we were to go to some sort of up front mandatory apportionment 
scheme, there would be several results. One is that it would delay cleanups ultimately. 
It would also make it a much more complex program for the administration or the 
Government to manage in that we would be forced to deal with a number of issues 
that we are now able to give to the private parties in a suit and force them to deal 
with. 
Apportionment is one of those issues that the parties must resolve among them-
selves. 
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1980s the DOJ sought favorable constructions of the statute in sev-
eral areas. This Article deals with three of the major areas. 
First, the DOJ sought a broad construction of the statute's liability 
provision, section 107, to maximize the number of parties who could 
be held liable for cleanup costS. 19 For persons identified as being 
liable in the statute, the DOJ sought to establish a standard of strict, 
joint and several liability without the need to prove a nexus between 
the defendant and the harm requiring cleanup.20 Second, the gov-
ernment sought to separate litigation over the allocation of respon-
sibility among liable parties from the government's case against the 
main defendants. 21 In this manner, the government might avoid 
complications and delays in obtaining the relief sought at the site. 
Third, the government sought to preclude judicial review of govern-
ment decisions about remedies to be undertaken at a site until such 
time as the government might choose to commence enforcement 
litigation. 22 By controlling the timing of judicial review, the govern-
ment could minimize potential judicial modification of its preferred 
remedies. 23 This approach, while initially successful, became re-
markably so as the CERCLA reauthorization process developed 
"post-hoc" legislative history favorable to the government's posi-
tion.24 
On the issues of liability, the government achieved initial signifi-
cant successes in 1983 and 1984. Defendants themselves initially 
raised the liability issues on a motion for summary judgment in 
United States v. Chem-Dyne COrp.25 After a careful analysis ofCER-
CLA's 1980 legislative history, Judge Rubin of the Southern District 
of Ohio concluded in Chem-Dyne that the 1980 lame-duck Congress's 
deletion of the term "joint and several" from CERCLA section 107 
19 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RCRAICERCLA ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 
(1984) (setting forth government's litigation position). 
20 See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 43--56 and accompanying text. 
23 Later the Department added a supplemental argument that any challenge to the remedy 
in an enforcement action in court is limited to an evaluation of information in the EPA's 
administrative record. See infra notes 102-112 and accompanying text. 
24 For example, the report of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 
largely tracks the government's proposed legislative history for enforcement provisions, in-
cluding the government's assertions that various provisions "clarif[y] and confirm[]" pre-
existing law. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-45, 57--58 (1985) (contribution and 
judicial review descriptions). The government's proposed legislative history may be found in 
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 136, 138-40, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2918, 2920-22. 
25 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
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did not mean that joint and several liability never could be imposed 
under the statute.26 In December of 1983, again on a defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, the court in United States v. Wade27 
construed section 107 not to require the government to prove any 
nexus between a generator's waste sent to a site and the spill or 
"release" that required cleanup.28 This greatly eased the plaintiff's 
burden of proof in CERCLA cases. 
The most significant breakthrough on liability, however, probably 
came in January, 1984, in United States v. South Carolina Recycling 
& Disposal, Inc. 29 In South Carolina Recycling, the Chemical Man-
ufacturers Association (CMA), a major lobbying force for industry, 
participated as amicus and argued "generic" positions that it had 
developed for its members' use. 30 The CMA and the generator de-
fendants filed joint briefs in the district court on defendants' motion 
for summary judgment.31 In December, 1983, however, shortly be-
fore the defendants' motion was to be argued, the government filed 
its own motion for partial summary judgment on liability against the 
defendants, using the freshly minted precedents in Chem-Dyne and 
Wade. 32 
At oral argument in South Carolina Recycling, the judge ruled 
for the government and requested that the government draft an 
order implementing his ruling. 33 The government drafted a lengthy 
opinion for the court, rooting its explanation in a plaintiff-oriented 
interpretation of the Chem-Dyne and Wade opinions. The govern-
ment lawyers took advantage of this opportunity to distinguish an-
other district court's opinion in United States v. A & F Materials 
26 Id. at 810-11. 
27 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
28 Id. at 1333-34. "Release" is defined in CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. §9601(22) (1988). 
29 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984), afi'd sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 
160 (4th Cir. 1988), eert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989). 
30 See FRANK & ATKESON, SUPERFUND LITIGATION AND CLEANUP: A BNA SPECIAL 
REPORT 41-42 & nn.290-93 (1985) (citing CHEMICAL MFRS. ASS'N, SUPERFUND: KEy LIA-
BILITY ISSUES (Dec. 1982». 
31 653 F. Supp. at 989. The briefs in support of the defendant generators' motion for 
summary. judgment were filed on June 28, 1983. Unusually, a lawyer for amicus curiae CMA 
argued the motions for summary judgment on behalf of the defendant generators in January, 
1984. 
32 The Wade decision came down on December 20, 1983. The government's motion for 
partial summary judgment on liability was filed on December 27, 1983. The trial judge's 
hearing on both the defendants' and the government's motion occurred on January 13, 1984. 
The court's opinion drafted by the government was signed on February 23, 1984. 
33 Transcript of the Proceedings Before the Honorable Charles E. Simon, Jr., Chief Judge, 
at 95, United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., No. 80-1274-6 (D.S.C. 
1984). 
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CO.,34 a less favorable decision that came down after the South 
Carolina court's bench ruling.35 The A & F Materials court expressly 
had adopted a more liberal, i.e. defense-oriented, view of the cir-
cumstances in which joint and several liability might be avoided 
through equitable apportionment under CERCLA. The South Car-
olina Recycling and Chem-Dyne opinions became the key early prec-
edents on CERCLA liability issues. 36 
Prior to 1986 the government had little need and few opportunities 
to address directly the problem of allocation of liability. Industrial 
defendants intent on challenging the availability of joint and several 
liability under CERCLA ignored contribution issues because contri-
bution presumes the existence of joint liability. To the extent that 
there was any debate at all over contribution, it largely turned 
around the simple issue of whether there was a right to contribution, 
given the absence of express statutory language on the point.37 The 
government argued that there was, and should be, a right to con-
tribution because this position shored up its advocacy of joint and 
several liability. 38 
A related debate turned around the appropriate order of bifur-
cated trials, whether remedy or liability should be litigated first. 
The government generally argued that liability issues should be 
litigated before remedy issues, but only to the extent of establishing 
joint and several liability to the government. 39 The government pre-
ferred to have the remedy decided before the court could turn to 
contribution issues. 
34 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984). 
35 The original of the South Carolina court's opinion of February 23, 1984, shows that the 
judge simply initialed most pages of the government's draft. The footnote distinguishing A & 
F Materials is found at 653 F. Supp. at 994 n.7. 
36 The South Carolina Recycling & Disposal opinion even adopted the government's 
unusual position that application of the statute's liability regime to defendant's conduct prior 
to the date of enactment was not "retroactive," but if retroactive was nevertheless constitu-
tional. 653 F. Supp. at 996-97. 
37 See generally Note, A Right of Contribution Under CERCLA: The Case for Federal 
Comrrwn Law, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 668 (1986); Note, The Right to Contributionfor Response 
Costs Under CERCLA, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345 (1985). 
38 See Note, A Right of Contribution Under CERCLA: The Case for Federal Common 
Law, supra note 37, at 677; Note, The Right to Contribution for Response Costs Under 
CERCLA, supra note 37, at 359. 
39 Compare United States v. Price, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2229, 2230 (D. N.J. 1984) 
(court ordered remedy to be tried prior to liability) with Kelley v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 
1103, 1109 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (liability was to be tried before remedy). During the reauthor-
ization, the government lobbied for a statutorily established order of trial. Superfund Im-
provement Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 51 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01 (1985) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Hearings]. 
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Virtually the only way the government was likely to become em-
broiled in contribution issues prior to passage of the 1986 amend-
ments was when it decided to forego its joint and several liability 
position against certain defendants and instead accepted a settlement 
from them for less than the complete relief sought for a site. 40 The 
question became whether or not the government's covenant not to 
sue a settlor extinguished any claim for contribution by a non-settlor 
whom the government continued to pursue.41 Though the govern-
ment claimed that it always extinguished such claims, some settlors 
were unwilling to rely on such assurances. They required commit-
ments from the government that it would make good any shortfall 
should a court disagree with its legal position on "contribution pro-
tection" and find the settlor liable in contribution. 42 
As to judicial review of government remedy decisions, in the early 
1980s the government found itself testing the construction of CER-
CLA in two contexts. In the first type of situation, pre-litigation 
negotiations between the government and potentially responsible 
parties dragged on long enough that the government began to pro-
ceed with the selection of a cleanup plan contemplating use of the 
Superfund.43 Defendants in these cases sought judicial review under 
the Administrative Procedure Act44 of the "final agency action," 
which would be the selection of the remedy the government had 
chosen to implement. Using the judicial review preclusion factors 
40 See, e.g., United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1338-39 (S.D. 
Ind. 1982) (companies paying for cleanup objected to paying more than companies performing 
cleanup). Subsequent courts frequently cite Seymour favorably for setting forth the criteria 
for approving partial settlements under CERCLA. See, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon 
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 689-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (lists procedural steps approvingly). The 
Seymour 1982 settlement, however, was criticized severely in SARA's legislative history. 
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 282-83, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2957-58. 
41 Beginning with United States V. Chern-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983), the 
government argued that the principles of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act 
(UCATA) should apply to CERCLA settlements. See Note, The Right to Contribution for 
Response Costs Under CERCLA, supra note 37, at 361. Commentators have argued persua-
sively that complete incorporation of the UCATA approach would be inappropriate in the 
context of CERCLA. [d. at 362-63. 
42 See, e.g., Seymour, 554 F. Supp. at 1347-48 (liabilities over and above agreed amounts 
to be sought from other, non-agreement tortfeasors). 
43 See, e.g., Lone Pine Steering Comm. V. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1487-88 (D. N.J.), afi'd, 
777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985), eert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986). In United States V. Western 
Processing Co., No. C83-252M (W.D. Wash. 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), the 
court allowed the EPA to proceed with its administrative action even though the Agency had 
already filed suit against the challenging defendants under CERCLA § 106. 
44 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). 
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set forth in the Supreme Court decision in Block v. Community 
Nutrition Institute,45 the courts agreed with the government that 
"[t]o allow judicial review ... would frustrate Congress [sic] intent 
to provide a mechanism whereby hazardous sites can be neutralized 
expeditiously. "46 
A second type of situation posed additional problems for the gov-
ernment. CERCLA section 106 authorized the EPA to issue admin-
istrative orders to compel certain cleanups from responsible parties 
in lieu of conducting the cleanup itself.47 Some recipients of such 
orders sought judicial review in advance of any action by the gov-
ernment to enforce the order. 48 
Plaintiffs in Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA49 sought a court injunction and 
declaratory judgment that no fines or punitive damages could be 
imposed as a result of their failure to comply with a unilateral 
administrative order issued to them because of the unavailability of 
pre-enforcement judicial review of the order. Even in the adminis-
trative order context, however, no court interpreted the statute to 
permit judicial review of the terms of the order prior to government 
commencement of an action against the recipient. 50 Moreover, the 
courts uniformly supported the government's position that the EPA 
could conduct the cleanup action after recipients failed to comply 
with an administrative order instructing them to do so. 51 One court, 
however, enjoined the EPA's imposition of any fines as a result of 
non-compliance because of the constitutional due process violation 
posed by the absence of any meaningful opportunity within the EPA 
to contest the terms of the order prior to the order becoming effec-
tive. 52 
The constitutional due process infirmity existed because the stat-
ute appeared to impose fines automatically upon a recipient's failure 
to comply with an order even if the defendant had a reasonable belief 
45 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984). 
46 Lone Pine, 600 F. Supp. at 1494-95; see also Wheaton Indus. v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354, 
356-57 (3d Cir. 1986); J. V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1985); B. R. 
MacKay & Sons, Inc. v. EPA, 633 F. Supp. 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1986). 
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). 
48 See, e.g., Industrial Park Dev. Co. v. EPA, 604 F. Supp. 1136, 1139--40 (E.D. Pa. 1985); 
Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69, 71 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
49 599 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
50 See id. at 71. 
51 See, e.g., J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263,264-66 (6th Cir. 1985) (no cause of 
action available to challenge the EPA response action); Industrial Park, 604 F. Supp. at 1144 
(court denied responsible party's motion for injunction to enjoin the EPA from conducting 
cleanup). 
52 Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. at 75-76. 
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that it was not subject to the order or that the order was otherwise 
invalid. 53 The statute put recipients of the EPA cleanup orders in 
the constitutional due process dilemma of either complying with the 
order and foregoing its opportunity to challenge the order's validity 
or failing to comply with the order and risking daily penalties as a 
result. 54 
This judicial decision prohibiting fines for non-compliance ob-
viously undermined the statute's threat of fines for violations of a 
cleanup order. Indeed, the government began to announce at the 
time it issued an administrative order that it would not seek fines 
for any violations in order to avoid having to litigate the constitu-
tionality of the fines provision. 55 In 1986, however, Congress 
amended section 106 to provide a "good faith" defense to penalties 
and a right of reimbursement for successful challengers. 56 
c. The Litigation Issues in the Reauthorization 
The liability, allocation-contribution, and pre-enforcement judicial 
review issues all became part of congressional consideration during 
the CERCLA reauthorization process conducted in 1985. In Feb-
ruary, 1985, the government expressed its preferences on these and 
other issues through legislation that the Reagan Administration pro-
posed. 57 The Administration released its proposal, complete with· 
associated "legislative history," less than a week before the sched-
uled mark-up of the CERCLA reauthorization bill in the Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works. 58 In a hurried mark-
up session, that committee adopted with minor changes many of the 
Administration's "enforcement" provisions covering liability, contri-
bution, and judicial review matters with little, if any, debate. 59 
Later in 1985, however, both the Senate Committee on Environ-
ment and Public Works ·and the Senate Committee on the JUdiciary 
53 See id. at 73-74. 
54 Id. at 75-76; see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 147 (1908); Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp. v. Engman, 527 F.2d 1115, 1119 (2d Cir. 1975), cen. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976). 
66 Aminoil, Inc. v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 294, 295-96 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (distinguishing 
defense to liability for punitive damages from defense to fines; constitutionality of latter moot 
because government abandoned any claim for fines). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(I), (2) (1988). 
57 See S. 494, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 1342, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
68 The Administration's "legislative history" for its bill was included in the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee's Report. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 120-
43 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2909-25. 
59 See generally Superfund Improvement Act of 1985: Hearing on S. 51 Before the Senate 
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
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examined the Administration's "enforcement" provisions more 
closely.60 On liability, Senator Stafford, the Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works, as well as a sponsor 
of the reauthorization bill, who was bound to support the legislation 
that he had stampeded through in February, resisted the Senate 
Judiciary Committee's attempt to obtain a 90-day sequential referral 
of the bill. 61 In a compromise, Senator Stafford acceded to Senator 
Thurmond, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
and agreed to a shorter period for referral. 62 Furthermore, Senator 
Thurmond limited the Judiciary Committee's review generally to 
three areas: judicial review, contribution, and citizen suits. Thur-
mond expressly agreed that his committee would not propose 
changes to the standards for strict, joint and several liability that 
had evolved in the courts. Nevertheless, Stafford agreed that the 
Judiciary Committee's hearings might inquire into the standard of 
liability area. 63 
Substantial criticisms of the litigation aspects of CERCLA, which 
the American Insurance Association (AlA) first brought to the at-
tention of Congress in January, 1985, spurred the Judiciary Com-
mittee's interest. 64 Indeed, the Senate Committee on Environment 
and Public Works itself held a hearing on the insurance industry's 
concerns in April, 1985, even though the bill that AlA criticized had 
already been reported from that committee. 65 This April, 1985, hear-
ing, as well as similar hearings conducted in the House of Represen-
tatives during the same period, did not go well for the government. 66 
60 See Insurance Hearing, supra note 3; Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 39. 
61 See Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 39, at 1. 
62 Id. 
63 See id. 
64 The AlA document that piqued interest in CERCLA liability issues was the AlA's 
Proposal to Reform and Expedite Cleanup Under Superfund. Senator Mitchell quoted from 
the proposal in questioning the government in the April hearing on insurance before the 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. Insurance Hearing, supra note 3, at 
13. 
65 Insurance Hearing, supra note 3. In his opening statement, Senator Stafford expressed 
that he was predisposed against the changes to the proposed bill sought by insurance industry 
interests. See id. at 2. In addition, he sharply limited the time available for the insurance 
industry, and in particular the American Insurance Association, to make its presentation 
during the hearing. Instead, Stafford provided the lion's share of the hearing to the govern-
ment and to insurance industry critics. See id. at 30 (Stafford informed AlA's president that 
the insurance industry would have "a cumulative total of 10 minutes" after he delayed the 
start of the industry's testimony until after its main witness had to leave). Id. 
66 See Superfund: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and 
Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [here-
inafter Superfund Hearings]; Superfund Reauthorization: Judicial and Legal Issues, Over-
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Regarding the CERCLA liability issues, elected officials with the 
staunchest of environmentalist reputations appeared to question the 
legal positions that the government had asserted as following 
congressional intent in the courts. For example, on the joint and 
several liability issue, Representative James Florio explained in 
April, 1985, that "where it appears to be fairly clear that one can 
demonstrate that one did contribute one barrel out of the hundred, 
one is only going to be responsible for one-hundredth of the cost. "67 
He asserted that this view was a clarification of present law and 
strongly disputed the government's position that joint and several 
liability must be applied where the harm is indivisible. 68 
During the April, 1985, hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works on insurance issues and the hearings 
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in June, 1985, the 
Assistant Attorney General for the Land and Natural Resources 
Section of the DOJ testified that no court would ever hold a small 
volume contributor jointly and severally liable under CERCLA.69 In 
essence, the government argued to Congress that the courts would 
never accept completely the joint and several liability doctrine that 
government lawyers had been advocating. 70 Indeed, the import of 
the views that the government expressed to Congress was that the 
courts should not completely accept its arguments in litigation con-
cerning joint and several liability. 
The Judiciary Committee reserved its most heated criticism of the 
Administration's Superfund reauthorization bill for the allocation/ 
contribution issue. The bill reported by the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works had proposed to defer all contribu-
tion claims associated with a CERCLA lawsuit until after the gov-
ernment had obtained judgment or settlement from the persons it 
had chosen to sue.71 The government's "legislative history" accom-
sight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Superfund 
Reauthorization Hearings]. 
67 Superfund Hearings, supra note 66, at 706. 
68 Id. at 707. 
69 Insurance Hearing, supra note 3, at 13 ("[W]e have not and don't intend to and I don't 
think we can impose liability for 100 percent of the costs on a de minimis contributor. "); see 
Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 39, at 46-47, 71; Superfund Reauthorization Hearings, 
supra note 66, at 14. 
70 The Assistant Attorney General also stated his view in published articles that "full 
liability could not be brought to bear, as a matter of law, against a truly minor contributor." 
Habicht, Statutory Hazardous Waste Liability: Problem Solving Outside the Judicial Branch, 
1 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 22, 26 (1986). 
71 S. 51, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 126 (1985) (proposed CERCLA § 107(1)(1)) ("In any civil 
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panying its proposed version stated that the deferral of contribution 
claims was intended to clarify present law.72 Finding the proposed 
regime to be contrary to the joinder and impleader provisions of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Senators Thurmond, Simpson, 
Hatch, and Specter lectured the government's witnesses at length. 73 
Even the government's fall-back position, that contribution claims 
could be made but then must be stayed pending resolution of the 
government's claim,74 found no acceptance during the hearings. 75 The 
best the government could manage on the issue of the timing of 
contribution claims was to compromise with the committee on an 
amendment expressly incorporating the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 76 
On the "contribution protection" question at issue in partial set-
tlements, the government agreed to two changes from the bill re-
ported by the Senate Environment Committee. First, language in 
the government's bill indicating that a partial settlement reduced 
the government's "claim" against non-settlors by any amount "stip-
ulated by" the settlement was changed to indicate that the non-
settlors' "potential liability" is reduced by the "amount" of the set-
tlement. 77 Second, language in the government's bill indicating that 
or administrative action under this section or section 106, no claim for contribution or indem-
nification may be brought until after entry of judgment or date of settlement in good faith."). 
72 H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 136 (1985) reprinted in 1986 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2918 ("The amendment would clarify that if an enforce-
ment is underway, claims for contribution or indemnification could not be brought until a 
judgment or settlement is reached."); cf S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1985) 
("The amendment provides that if an action under section 106 or section 107 of the Act is 
underway, any related claim for contribution or indemnification may not be brought until a 
judgment or settlement is reached in such action."). 
73 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 39, at 73 (Sen. Thurmond), 77-78 (Sen. Simpson), 
91-93 (Sen. Hatch), 99-101 (Sen. Specter). 
74 See id. at 64-65 ("In any civil action brought by the United States or a State under this 
section or by the United States under section 106, all proceedings on claims in the nature of 
contribution or indemnification shall by stayed pending entry of judgment or settlement on 
the claims of the United States or the State under this section or section 106."). 
75 [d. at 100-01. 
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1988); 131 CONGo REC. S11,854 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985). 
The government acknowledged in House hearings that it modified its position in response to 
concerns of members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Superfund Reautlwrization Hear-
ings, supra note 66, at 245. Senator Thurmond referred to the package of amendments to the 
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee bill, which became part of the Senate bill 
as floor amendments, as the "Thurmond-EPA-DOJ package." 131 CONGo REC. S11,857-59 
(daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
77 Compare S. 494, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1985) (proposed CERCLA § 107(k)(3), 
(k)(4)) (Administration bill) with 131 CONGo REC. S11,855 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985) (proposed 
CERCLA § 107(1)(3)) (Senate Judiciary Committee floor amendment). 
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after a partial settlement the government may bring an action "for 
the remainder of the relief sought" was deleted, leaving only lan-
guage stating that the government may bring an -action. 78 Both 
changes became part of the amended statute. 79 
On judicial review issues, the government's positions fared con-
siderably better in the committee hearings. AlA's initial criticisms 
of the Superfund litigation regime did not focus on the need for 
judicial review because that association was advocating drastic lim-
itation, not expansion, of litigation in the CERCLA arena.8O Interest 
in the Senate Judiciary Committee focused on elaboration of the 
administrative process of selecting remedies under CERCLA. The 
committee sought to ensure that the "hybrid" notice and comment 
processes it previously had advocated for rulemaking in earlier reg-
ulatory reform legislation would be applied, where appropriate, to 
the Superfund process.81 
Otherwise, the committee approached the judicial review preclu-
sion question in a technical way. The committee assisted the gov-
ernment by providing a practical amendment designed to alleviate 
the constitutional due process problem identified in Aminoil as re-
sulting from the unavailability of pre-enforcement review of section 
106 orders. 82 The committee's staff and representatives from the 
EPA and the DOJ agreed upon amendments in what became known 
as the Thurmond-EPA-DOJ package. On judicial review, these 
78 See 131 CONGo REC. Sl1,854 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1987). Compare S. 51, 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 126 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1985) (proposed CERCLA § lO7(1)(4)) (bill as reported from 
Senate Environment Committee) with S. 494, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1985) (proposed 
CERCLA § lO7(k)(4)) (original Administration bill). 
79 See CERCLA § 113(f)(2), (3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(F)(2), (3)(A) (1988). 
80 The AlA did not mention pre-enforcement review in its hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works. Insurance Hearing, supra note 3, at 30-52. 
In the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, the AlA did criticize the 
preclusion of pre-enforcement review as the reauthorization process proceeded. See Senate 
Judiciary Hearings, supra note 39, at 574-75 (AlA's prepared statement). 
81 See Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 39, at 88-90 (remarks of Sen. Grassley); 131 
CONGo REC. Sl1,856 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Stafford); 131 CONGo REC. 
Sl1,858 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
82 Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69, 75-76 (C.D. Cal. 1984); 131 CONGo REC. Sl1,856 
(daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Stafford); 131 CONGo REC. Sl1,857 (daily ed. 
Sept. lO, 1985) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); 131 CONGo REC. Sl1,858 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 
1985) (statement of Sen. Grassley). The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 
had, at the urging of the Justice Department, included "legislative history" in its report 
suggesting that no due process problem existed with the 1980 version of the Act. See S. REP. 
No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59 (1985) ("This [order recipient reimbursement] amendment 
is not nece~3itated by any constitutional infirmity of section 106, as enacted in 1980, which 
already affords adequate protection of potentially responsible parties' due process rights. "). 
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amendments added a "sufficient cause" defense to CERCLA fines. 83 
Because penalties clearly would not be automatic upon the finding 
of a party liable under a valid order, presumably no constitutional 
due process question would arise under the revised statute. 84 
Despite intense criticism of the government's positions during the 
Senate hearings on a number of controversial issues, the government 
emerged from reauthorization with its litigation position in the courts 
largely intact, and in some cases enhanced. Congress made no 
changes to the standard and scope of liability, and some new legis-
lative history expressly endorsed the case-by-case application of joint 
and several liability evolving in the courts. The government com-
promised on contribution and bowed to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a regime that already supposedly governed CERCLA 
litigation in the federal courts. New technical settlement reduction 
rules alleviated the need for the government to include contribution 
protection in consent decrees and could achieve the same effect by 
operation of law. Regarding pre-enforcement judicial review, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee solved the constitutional difficulty with 
the administrative order regime and adopted judicial review preclu-
sion language codifying the government's successful position in the 
courts. 
D. Litigation During the Reauthorization 
The government did not wait for the final enactment of SARA to 
make use of valuable "legislative history" that it had influenced 
during the process. Committee reports that endorsed United States 
v. Chem-Dyne COrp.85 and its progeny found their way into govern-
ment briefs and subsequently into judicial opinions affirming the 
government's position on strict, joint and several liability.86 The 
government's successes in Congress on the pre-enforcement review 
83 131 CONGo REC. S11,856 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985 (statement of Sen. Stafford). The 1980 
version of CERCLA allowed imposition of punitive damages under section 107(c)(3) only 
where the administrative order recipient did not comply with the order without "sufficient 
cause." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1988). No similar exception was provided with respect to the 
imposition of daily fines for violations of such orders. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988). The 
Thurmond-EPA-DOJ package simply added the "sufficient cause" exception to the daily fines 
provision. 131 CONGo REC. S11,856 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Stafford). 
84 131 CONGo REC. S11,857 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
85 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
86 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 74 (1985); 132 CONGo REC. 
H9624 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Eckart); 132 CONGo REC. H9563 (daily ed. 
Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Dingell). 
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issue soon found prominence in government briefs and judicial opin-
ions. 87 
At first blush, SARA's evolving legislative history added little 
more than a congressional endorsement of judicial opinions on the 
timing of judicial review. The saga of the Wagner Seed Company, 
however, demonstrates the subtle ways in which even an inchoate 
SARA could be used. On June 1, 1985, Wagner Seed Company's 
warehouse on Long Island, New York, was struck by lightning.88 
The fire required a cleanup of hazardous substances at the property. 
Prior to passage of SARA, on New Year's Eve, December 31, 1985, 
the EPA ordered Wagner Seed Company to do a cleanup.89 Wagner 
Seed resisted, asserting that the release of hazardous substances 
requiring cleanup had been caused solely by an act of God, making 
out a colorable defense to liability under CERCLA section 
107(b)(I).90 
Wagner Seed sought pre-enforcement judicial review of the order. 
By this time in 1985, however, the government had modified its 
approach in light of the A minoil91 ruling. In its brief, the government 
emphasized the availability of the sufficient cause or good faith de-
fense found in CERCLA section 107(c)(3) as a way to avoid the due 
process problem that had caused the injunction to issue in Aminoil. 92 
In a different case, Wagner Electric Corp. v. Thomas,93 the govern-
ment had persuaded the court that the imposition of punitive dam-
ages was not unconstitutional because the court did not have to 
impose them when the defendant had failed to comply with the order 
in a good faith belief that he was not liable to comply.94 The court 
agreed with the government that CERCLA section 107(c)(3) prohib-
its a reviewing court from assessing punitive damages against a 
party who fails to comply with an EPA order in the reasonable belief 
that it has a valid defense to that order. 95 As a result, there was no 
need for the court to enjoin the enforcement of the CERCLA statute, 
as the court had in Aminoil. 96 
87 See, e.g., J. v. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting S. REP. 
No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1985) (report of the Senate Committee on Environment and 
Public Works». 
88 Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156, 1156-57 (E.D.N.Y.), 
aff'd, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986). 
89 Id. at 1157. 
00 Id. 
91 Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
92 See generally Wagner Seed, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1158. 
93 612 F. Supp. 736 (D. Kan. 1985). 
94 Id: at 745. 
95 Id. 
96 Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69, 74-76 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
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Similarly, in Wagner Seed Co., the district court refused to follow 
Aminoil because it found an implicit good faith defense to punitive 
damages in the sufficient cause language of CERCLA section 
107(c)(3).97 Wagner Seed Co. surpassed the Wagner Electric Co. 
holding, however, by finding that a similar defense existed to fines 
imposed or levied under CERCLA section 106(b)(1).98 An injunction 
against fines assessed also was found unnecessary under the Wagner 
Seed Co. court's interpretation because it found that no fines could 
be imposed in the event Wagner Seed Company proved that it had 
a reasonable belief that it was not liable for cleanup under the order. 99 
By the time Wagner Seed Co. was decided at the district court 
level, a number of courts already had decided to defer judicial review 
of proposed cleanup remedies until the filing of a government en-
forcement action.1°O Codification of these holdings was the major 
objective of the government's 1985 judicial review proposal, which 
eventually became CERCLA section 113(h) after adoption of 
SARA.101 This judicial review provision, however, did something 
even more significant. The provision proposed to establish a regime 
in which government decisions to select remedies would be review-
able only with reference to an administrative record prepared by 
the EPA.102 
In some ways, the record review regime in the proposed legislation 
was at war with the position that the government had advocated in 
the courts to defer judicial review until enforcement. The govern-
ment had argued successfully that judicial review was unavailable 
for remedy decisions because the EPA's selection of a remedy under 
CERCLA was not a "final agency action" within the meaning of the 
Administrative Procedure Act's provisions regarding judicial re-
view. 103 Following the government's lead, courts deferring review 
!Y1 See Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156, 1158 (E.D.N.Y.), 
aiI'd, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986). The district court adopted the reasoning of the government's 
brief without reciting that reasoning in its opinion. "For all the reasons set forth in section 
II(a)(2) of defendant's moranda [sic], however, the Court finds that there is no due process 
violation here and rejects the reasoning of the principal case relied on by plaintiff." Id. (citing 
Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. 69). 
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. at 1157-58. 
101 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). 
102 This proposal originated in S. 494, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207 (1985). It became S. 51, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 133 (1985). With changes, the record review provision is found at 42 
U.S.C. § 9613(j) (1988). 
103 E.g., J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263,265 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Nor do we believe 
that a response action is final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a 
court. "). See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text. 
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noted that de novo review would be available when the eventual 
enforcement action took place. 104 
Limiting judicial review of an administrative order to the admin-
istrative record would not meet the Wagner Electric Co. standard 
of providing "a 'meaningful manner' of affording aggrieved parties 
an opportunity to be heard," because no hearing would be available 
in the agency under CERCLA.105 Without any hearing at the EPA, 
record review limitations in the court could amount to a denial of 
any meaningful hearing whatsoever. Under the new statute, remedy 
decisions would be narrowly reviewed under nothing more than an 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. 106 
As soon as the Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
Works included language embodying the government's proposed re-
view in the Senate reauthorization bill in February, 1985, DOJ law-
yers began to cite the "legislative history" of the new provision for 
the proposition that record review had always been applicable under 
CERCLA.107 The Environment Committee Report stated that the 
record review amendment was intended to "clarify and confirm" pre-
existing CERCLA law. lOB In United States v. Occidental Chemical 
Corp. ,109 in December, 1985, the United States filed an amicus brief 
in support of New York's motion to argue that judicial review of 
Love Canal remedy issues should be limited to the EPA's adminis-
trative record. llo A major focus of the government's argument was 
104 E.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412,421 n.5 (D. Minn. 
1985). 
105 See Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 747 (D. Kan. 1985) ("To limit a 
reviewing court to the administrative record, at least where no administrative hearing is 
required, would surely not be a 'meaningful manner' of affording aggrieved parties an oppor-
tunity to be heard."); Reilly, 606 F. Supp. at 418. 
106 42 U. S. C. § 9613(j)(2) (1988). "In considering objections raised in any judicial action 
under this Chapter, the court shall uphold the President's decision in selecting the response 
action unless the objecting party can demonstrate, on the administrative record, that the 
decision was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. 
107 See generally Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986). 
108 S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1985) ("This amendment clarifies and confirms 
that judicial review of a response action is limited to the administrative record .... ") (emphasis 
added). See also H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 82 (1985) ("To ensure 
that enforcement and cost recovery actions will not be delayed . . . judicial review should 
continue to be on the administrative record that has been assembled.") (emphasis added); 131 
CONGo REC. Hll,084 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) ("New subsection 113(j)(1) clarifies that judicial 
review of the Administrator's selection of a response action shall be based on the administrative 
record .... ") (emphasis added). 
109 No. 79-990 (JTC) (W.D.N. Y.) (brief filed Dec. 20, 1985). 
no United States' Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Occidental Chemical 
Corporation's Motion to Compel Production of Documents Withheld by New York on the Basis 
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the "post hoc" legislative history from the Senate Environment Com-
mittee Report. 
The 1986 changes to the statute adopted in SARA establish record 
review for remedies "taken or ordered by the President"lll where 
the remedy decision was made using the administrative record-build-
ing process that SARA also establishes. 112 The DOJ's extension of 
the applicability of the provisions to cases pending and remedy de-
cisions made prior to the enactment of the amendments was novel. 
III. PosT-SARA LITIGATION 
As described above, the government's litigation posture on issues 
of liability, contribution, and judicial review prior to enactment of 
SARA was consistent with the government's pursuit of efficiency in 
the prosecution of these potentially unwieldy and complex cases. An 
efficiency objective supported perennial emphases on (1) joint and 
several liability (alleviating the burden of joining defendants); (2) 
bifurcation or severance (reducing the complications evident with 
large numbers of parties with diverse claims); (3) preclusion of any 
judicial review of the government's CERCLA activities at the behest 
of those unhappy with such activities (allowing the commencement 
of enforcement suits with all deliberate speed); and (4) limitation to 
record review (dispensing with the potentially nettlesome processes 
of discovery or trial). 113 
As the activities of the reauthorization period show, the govern-
ment's early successes in the legislative process provided additional 
ammunition and, indeed, made possible additional arguments for 
CERCLA interpretations favorable to this efficiency objective. Post-
hoc legislative history to "clarify and confirm" principles provided 
new "evidence" for the government's CERCLA interpretations. It 
was not until after President Reagan signed SARA in October, 1986, 
however, that the full extent of the government's possible use of 
SARA's extensive "legislative history" to support new and novel 
interpretations of the amended statute became apparent. Not all of 
SARA's language favored the government's preferred positions, but 
of Deliberative Privilege at 9, United States v. Occidental Chern. Corp. (No. 79-990(JTC» 
(W.D.N. Y.) (filed Dec. 20, 1985). 
111 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j) (1988) (record review). 
112 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(k), 9617 (1988). 
113 Of course, minimization of the government's costs does not necessarily coincide with 
optimization of the total societal resources devoted to remedying any particular site. See 
United States v. New Castle County, 116 F.R.D. 19, 28 (D. Del. 1987). 
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its "legislative history," more susceptible to manipulation by gov-
ernment lobbyists and congressional staff,114 proved quite useful. 
A. Liability 
Although SARA made no significant changes to the key liability 
language in CERCLA section 107, the government made extensive 
use of other provisions added by SARA and of SARA's legislative 
history to argue that Congress intended to hold small volume con-
tributors jointly and severally liable for all cleanup costs under the 
statute. 115 The government asserted that the SARA amendments 
"confirm that factors such as the volume of waste sent to a site are 
relevant only in contribution actions, and may not be used to under-
cut joint and several liability. "116 
This new small contributor argument rested on a description in 
the House Judiciary Committee report explaining the new contri-
bution provision, section 113(f) , of the statute originally drafted in 
the Senate Judiciary Committee.ll7 For example, in the South Car-
olina Recycling appeal, the government argued that the report of 
the House Judiciary Committee indicated that a court could not 
consider volume in deciding the issue of joint and several liability. 
Only after all questions of liability and remedy have been resolved 
might a court consider whether there should be an apportionment 
using such factors as the amount of hazardous substances sent to a 
site by generators. 118 
This use of SARA's legislative history was ironic. As noted above, 
the South Carolina Recycling district court opinion, which was 
114 It is difficult for lobbyists and staff to manipulate statutory language, which elected 
officials tend to focus on in mark-up sessions, or the conference report, which conferees often 
take a direct role in negotiating. It is easier to manipulate committee reports, which few 
elected officials probably even read, as well as floor statements and colloquys, which often are 
inserted in the record without much notice during floor debates. See Hirschey v. Federal 
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d I, 7-8 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
SARA's legislative history is replete with outraged comments by members of the House of 
Representatives as they became aware of staff manipulation of Senator Stafford's remarks at 
the time the SARA conference report was agreed to on the floor of the Senate. See 132 Congo 
Rec. H9562-63, H9565, H9573, H9582-83, H9591-92 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statements of 
Senators Dingell, Lent, Snyder, Glickman and Kindness). 
115 See Joint Brief of the United States and South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control at 39, United States V. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cen. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989) (Nos. 86-1261(L), 86-1263, 86-1265) [hereinafter DOJ Monsanto 
Brief]. 
116 [d. 
117 [d. at 40 n.l. 
118 [d. at 40 (citations omitted). 
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drafted by DOJ lawyers, distinguished away the moderate approach 
to joint and several liability taken in United States v. A & F Mate-
rials Co. 119 The Judiciary Committee report cited A & F Materials 
Co. favorably as a source of equitable factors that courts might look 
to in "apportionment" of CERCLA liability. 120 The A & F Materials 
court had referred to equitable factors such as the volume of sub-
stances contributed in the context of a possible determination that 
joint and several liability should not be imposed, not the determi-
nation of the equitable shares of persons jointly and severally liable 
to the government. 121 
Indeed, the JUdiciary Committee report passage to which the 
government cited in its South Carolina Recycling appellate brief 
appears to be referring to "apportionment" in the divisibility sense 
(avoiding joint and several liability) rather than the contribution 
sense. Immediately following the report's reference to A & F Ma-
terials Co., there is a reference to the passage inChem-Dyne placing 
the burden of apportionment in the divisibility sense on the defen-
dant seeking to avoid joint and several liability. 122 In its South Car-
olina Recycling appellate brief, however, the government used the 
report's references to the A & F Materials Co. factors to support a 
contrary inference. 123 The government argued that volume should 
be looked to only for allocating liability among jointly and severally 
liable persons, not as a basis for allowing a small volume contributor 
to avoid joint and several liability.124 
The government also referred to part of SARA's settlement pro-
vision, CERCLA section 122(g),125 which encourages the govern-
ment to settle with small volume contributors, in support of its 
argument that Congress did not intend to allow volume to be used 
as a basis to avoid joint and several liability. The government wrote 
that Congress's inclusion in SARA of section 122(g), a provision 
designed to encourage the EPA to enter into early settlements with 
small contributors, meant that waste volume is not a factor that 
affects joint and several liability. Through the SARA provision, 
Congress was said to "clarify and confirm" that volume could only 
119 See supra notes 33--42 and accompanying text. 
120 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
121 United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1258 (S.D. Ill. 1984). 
122 H.R. REP. No. 253, Part III, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3038, 3042. 
123 See DOJ Monsanto Brief, supra note 115, at 40. 
124 [d. 
125 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (1988). 
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affect "a responsible party's ability to limit its monetary exposure 
by early settlement. "126 
Prior to SARA, the Assistant Attorney General argued to Con-
gress that no court would or should impose joint and several liability 
on a small volume contributor.127 After SARA, in the above-quoted 
brief, which he signed, he interpreted the revised Act to "clarify 
and confirm" the opposite position, that Congress meant for joint 
and several liability to apply no matter how small the volume. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did not adopt the 
government's position on small volume contributors in the South 
Carolina Recycling case. Instead, it allowed that in some circum-
stances volume might be relevant to a defendant's establishment of 
a reasonable basis for apportionment or "divisibility," to avoid joint 
and several liability.128 To establish divisibility under the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals' approach, however, such a defendant would 
need to establish that proportionate volumes are "probative of con-
tributory harm. "129 The court explained that "[v ]olumetric contri-
butions provide a reasonable basis for apportioning liability only if 
it can be reasonably assumed, or it has been demonstrated, that 
independent factors had no substantial effect on the harm to the 
environment. "130 Because the generator defendants in Monsanto did 
not even attempt such a demonstration, the Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's ruling for summary judgment in favor of the 
United States. 131 
In O'Neil v. Picillo,132 however, the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit appears to have been more impressed by the government's 
SARA-based arguments. In O'Neil, a court was again presented 
with defendant generators' arguments that their demonstrable con-
tribution of substances to a site was insubstantial. 133 They contended 
that it was possible to apportion the plaintiff's past removal costs 
because there was evidence detailing (1) the total number of barrels 
excavated in each phase, (2) the number of barrels in each phase 
attributable to them, and (3) the total cost associated with each 
phase. 134 
126 DOJ Monsanto Brief, supra note 115, at 41-42 (citations omitted). 
127 Supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
128 United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1988). 
129 [d. at 172. 
130 [d. at 172 n.27. 
131 [d. at 172-73. 
132 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1115 (1990). 
133 [d. at 178. 
134 [d. at 181. 
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The court finessed the issue. Tracking the government's brief, the 
court noted that in SARA Congress had added two important pro-
visions designed to mitigate the harshness of joint and several lia-
bility, the small contributor settlement provision in CERCLA sec-
tion 122(g) and the contribution provision in CERCLA section 
113(f).135 The First Circuit went on to hold generator defendant 
Rohm & Haas jointly and severally liable because of its inability to 
prove that unidentified wastes at the site at issue had not come from 
Rohm & Haas, although only very small volumes of waste traceable 
to Rohm & Haas were found at the site. 136 With the O'Neil holding, 
apportionment had run its course from divisibility to contribution. 
B. Contribution 
Since SARA's enactment, the government has argued that the 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Work's provision pro-
posing to preclude trial of contribution claims until after the govern-
ment's case was intended to "clarify and confirm" pre-existing prac-
tice. It has argued this position even though the Senate Judiciary 
Committee subsequently changed the language cited in the earlier 
committee report regarding compulsory deferral of contribution 
claims under CERCLA.137 The government has relied on the history 
of the later rejected compulsory deferral provision to argue that 
contribution claims always must be heard after judgment is entered 
for the government against the main defendants. l38 In most cases, 
however, the government has argued more modestly that such claims 
usually should be heard after judgment. In such cases the govern-
ment has cited the following comment by Senator Stafford on the 
floor of the Senate: 
As a general rule private party cleanup will occur more quickly 
if the courts first resolve issues of liability and remedies con-
cerning the individual defendants, leaving questions of appor-
135 Id. at 179 (citations omitted). 
136 Id. at 182-83. 
137 E.g., Objection of the United States to the Motion of Kurfees Coatings, Inc., for Leave 
to File a Third Party Complaint at 5-9, United States v. Distler, No. C88-0201-L(J) (W.D. 
Ky. December 19, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file 3717). Relying in part on the 
legislative history of the earlier provision of S. 51, it argues that "Congress intended that 
CERCLA enforcement actions not be delayed by litigation of contribution claims." Id. at 12. 
In the alternative, it argues for severance and/or stay of third-party claims because of the 
defendant's delay in bringing its third-party claims. Id. at 14-15. 
138 Id. at 12-14 & n.17. 
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tionment [allocation?] until after the Government's action has 
been completed. 139 
There is an obvious inconsistency between the government's liti-
gation position and the Senate Judiciary Committee's view of how 
impleader should work in CERCLA cases. 140 Impleader is intended 
to foster judicial economy for all parties by resolving allocation issues 
prior to the entry of judgment. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
a member of that committee queried the new Assistant Attorney 
General about the DOJ's position during his confirmation hearing in 
1989. 141 Assistant Attorney General Stewart told Senator Grassley 
that "it is my understanding that the United States generally does 
not oppose concurrent litigation of its claims and defendants' claims 
for contribution. "142 And, indeed, one of the government's post-
SARA briefs can be interpreted to mean that CERCLA section 
113(f)143 puts within the defendant's, not the government's or the 
court's, discretion a defendant's decision to include its contribution 
claim in the government's action. 144 Albeit reluctantly and at times 
haltingly, when it was before Congress, the DOJ appears to have 
changed its legal position on the timing of contribution claims under 
CERCLA as a result of the Senate Judiciary Committee's amend-
ments. 145 
The DOJ's position in the courts on the timing issue has remained 
largely unchanged, however. The deferral position has prevailed 
in the courts. In the South Carolina Recycling appeal, the. govern-
ment successfully argued that district courts have discretion to 
dismiss contribution claims without prejudice without having 
to file a Rule 54(b) certificate146 along with the entry of final judg-
139 131 CONGo REC. S11,855 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Stafford), quoted 
in DOJ Monsanto Brief, supra note 115, at 10. 
140 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
141 See Letter from Carol T. Crawford, Assistant Attorney General, to Hon. Joseph R. 
Biden, Chairman, Senate Judiciary, July 28, 1989 (containing nominee Richard B. Stewart's 
responses to written questions from Sen. Grassley and Sen. Heflin) (available in Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review offices). 
142 Id. at 4. 
143 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988). 
144 Light, U.S. v. Monsanto: Inconsistency in the Government's Position on the Timing of 
CERCLA Contribution Claims, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,163, 10,164 (1989). 
145 During the reauthorization, the government acknowledged to Congress "modification" 
in its position. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. 
146 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) allows a court to enter final judgment on some 
claims while other claims, e.g., cross-claims for indemnity and contribution, remain only where 
it makes an express finding that there is no just reason for delay of entry of final judgment. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). A "partial" final judgment may be appealed only where the district 
court has prepared the Rule 54(b) certificate to accompany the judgment. 
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ment. 147 Similarly, in the O'Neil and United States v. Stringfellow148 
cases, the government convinced the trial court to defer trial of 
contribution claims until after final judgment had been entered in 
the government's case. 
On the related judgment reduction issue discussed above, Con-
gress's changes to the government's reauthorization proposals have 
not affected the DOJ's adherence to its pre-SARA position either in 
the courts or in congressional testimony. The government has fo-
cused attention on CERCLA section 113(f)(2), which extinguishes 
claims for contribution against those who have settled with the 
government, and concurrently reduces the potential liability of non-
settlors by "the amount of the settlement. "149 The government, and 
now a number of courts following the government's view, implicitly 
read the word "only" into CERCLA section 113(f)(2).150 Thus, in 
this view, "the words of the statute are clear: the potential liability 
of the others is reduced 'by the amount of the settlement,' not by 
the settlor's proportionate share of any damages ultimately deter-
mined to have been caused. "151 
No court yet has had occasion to discuss the changes made by the 
Senate to CERCLA sections 113(f)(2) and 113(f)(3)(A) from the 
government's proposal discussed above. 152 Because no court has re-
viewed the question, the government has achieved the best of both 
worlds: protection of its settlors and elimination of the risk it had to 
bear in pre-SARA settlements that a "sweetheart deal" might pre-
vent full recovery of the remainder of cleanup costs from non-set-
tlors. 
c. Judicial Review 
The government has handled judicial review issues after SARA 
somewhat differently from the issues discussed above, at least in 
degree. On judicial review, SARA was a watershed in which the 
government's construction of the statute sharply changed. This sit-
uation presents the issue of whether or not the new statutory pro-
147 United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173 (4th Cir. 1988). 
148 United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060-61 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 
149 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (1988); United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 
1047-48 (D. Mass. 1989), afi'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990); Acushnet River & New Bedford 
Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1027, 1029, 1032 (D. Mass. 1989). 
150 See Light, Goodnight, Sweetheart?, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 659, 660 (1989). 
151 Acushnet & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. at 1027. 
152 See supra notes 77-79. 
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visions, and the government's new interpretations, should be applied 
retrospectively. 
The continuing saga of the Wagner Seed case is a good place to 
start. After the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's ruling that 
there were good faith defenses to fines and punitive damages under 
the statute prior to the amendments,153 Wagner Seed decided to 
comply with the order and finished the cleanup ordered after SARA 
was enacted. l54 The company petitioned the Superfund for reim-
bursement of its reasonable expenses under CERCLA section 
106(b )(2)155 of the revised statute on the grounds that it was not 
liable for cleanup because of the act of God defense. 156 
The government denied the petition on the grounds that the reim-
bursement provisions added to section 106(b) by SARA were not 
retroactive. In short, because the order was issued to Wagner Seed 
prior to the date of SARA's enactment, no reimbursement was 
available. On Wagner Seed's appeal from the EPA decision, the 
district court agreed with the EPA. 157 
Although the reimbursement provision had been drafted by the 
government and was contained in early versions of SARA in both 
the House and the Senate, the sole "legislative history" that could 
be read as reflecting upon the retroactivity of the provision is found 
in a short floor statement by Representative Eckart. The statement, 
inserted in the record when the Conference Report was adopted in 
October, 1986, contained a single sentence stating that "effective 
after the date of enactment of these amendments, a party who re-
ceives an order can begin the work of environmental cleanup while 
preserving its right to raise objections in a subsequent proceed-
ing."l58 Using this passage, the government successfully argued that 
Congress intended that the provision not be applied to administra-
tive orders issued prior to the date of enactment of the amend-
ments. 159 
The government's prospective-only interpretation of SARA's 
reimbursement provision contrasts sharply with its implicit inter-
153 See supra notes 88-102 and accompanying text. 
154 Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 709 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1989). 
155 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2) (1988). 
156 Wagner Seed, 709 F. Supp. at 250. 
157 I d. at 252--53. 
158 132 CONGo REC. H9624 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Eckart) (emphasis 
added). 
159 See, e.g., Gary Steel Supply Co. v. Reagan, 711 F. Supp. 471, 474 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
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pretation of SARA's other amendments to CERCLA section 106, 
such as the addition of the sufficient cause or good faith defense to 
fines. Only by reading the pre-SARA statute as providing an implicit 
good faith defense to fines under CERCLA section 106(b)(1),160 de-
spite the absence of a clear textual basis for such interpretation, had 
the Second Circuit been able to avoid the Aminoil court's conclusion 
that CERCLA's administrative order fines were unconstitutional. 161 
Only if the amendments' good faith defense to fines merely clarified 
and confirmed the already implicit defense could the pre-SARA stat-
ute survive the constitutional challenge. 
Although the Second Circuit's opinion in Wagner Seed Co., decided 
a month prior to SARA's enactment, provides some support for the 
notion that the addition of the sufficient cause defense to fines simply 
clarified and confirmed pre-existing law, no similar opinion exists for 
a second major judicial review interpretation that the government 
began to make after SARA's enactment-record review. In the 1986 
amendments to CERCLA, Congress added a provision, drafted by 
the government, providing for record review of the EPA's selection 
of a response action for CERCLA cost-recovery cases. 162 The gov-
ernment's cause celebre since the enactment of SARA, however, has 
been to apply the record review standard retroactively to pending 
injunctive relief cases. Discovery on remedy issues in these cases 
had been underway for years and the Agency's administrative pro-
cess for obtaining public comment had been, to put it charitably, 
undisciplined. 163 
160 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(l) (1988). 
161 See Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 1986). 
162 See supra notes 102-112 and accompanying text. 
163 See Reply Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion for a Ruling as to 
the Appropriate Scope and Standard of Review and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Declaration on Standard of Review at 12, Kelly v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1454 
(W.D. Mich. 1989) (No. K86-167-CA8) [hereinafter Thomas Solvent Brief]. The government 
argued that: 
It is defendants' burden to demonstrate any such inadequacies in the record. As the 
United States has not yet submitted for review the administrative records for re-
sponse actions undertaken to date, a finding on their sufficiency is premature. Fur-
thermore, as the record concerning the permanent remedy at this site is not yet 
closed, there is no basis for challenge of that record at this time. 
ld. (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Hardage, 663 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (W.D. 
Okla. 1987) ("Presently, the government has failed to certify an administrative record to the 
Court."); United States v. Hardage, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,242,20,243 (W.D. 
Okla. 1986) ("The Court further finds EPA failed to take any administrative action reasonably 
calculated to yield an administrative record to which this Court would be bound in the instant 
litigation. "). 
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Moreover, in several of these cases the government sought to limit 
review to the administrative record prior to the time in which the 
EPA had certified the "record" for the court to review. 164 Because 
the United States often had not submitted for review the adminis-
trative records for response actions when they made pre-trial mo-
tions seeking to limit review to the administrative record, it is 
difficult to see how a court could have certified their sufficiency. 165 
Despite initial rulings against it regarding its new retroactive record 
review interpretation, the United States plunged ahead in these 
cases, seeking reconsideration at every opportunity. 166 
The government charged on in 1988 and 1989 with its record 
review arguments, expanding the concept in an attempt to extin-
guish pre-trial discovery on the matter of whether specific costs may 
be recovered in CERCLA cases. The government began in 1988 to 
advocate a two-step judicial review process. First, the court deter-
mines whether, based on the administrative record, the remedy 
selected by the EPA is not inconsistent with the national contingency 
plan under an arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 167 Second, 
if the court upholds the EPA decision, it examines the United States' 
costs to determine whether the costs were actually incurred because 
the statute conclusively presumes all incurred costs to be reason-
able. 168 The DOJ has admitted that this interpretation is inconsistent 
with its previously expressed interpretation of CERCLA, and has 
acknowledged that its pre-SARA briefs do "not represent the cur-
rent position of the United States on the legal issue addressed."169 
Finally, in 1989 the government began interpreting CERCLA to 
prohibit discovery regarding both the government's decisions imple-
164 Thomas Solvent Brief, supra note 163, at 12. 
165 See supra note 163. 
166 See, e.g., United States v. Hardage, 733 F. Supp. 1424 (W.D. Okla. 1988); United States 
v. Hardage, 663 F. Supp. 1280 (W.D. Okla. 1987); United States v. Hardage, 17 Envtl. L. 
Rep. 20,242 (W.D. Okla. 1986). In 1990, the Hardage court after trial rejected the govern-
ment's remedy and adopted a remedy proposed by the Hardage Steering Committee defen-
dants. Shortly thereafter, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed another district court 
that refused to apply the record review standard retroactive to a pending injunctive relief 
case. See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429, 432 (1st Cir. 1990). 
167 See Thomas Solvent Brief, supra note 163, at 15. 
168 ld. 
169 See id. at 16 n.12. See also United States' Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Oppo-
sition to Occidental Chemical Corporation's Motion to Compel Production of Documents With-
held by New York on the Basis of Deliberative Privilege at 3 n.4, United States v. Occidental 
Chern. Corp. (No. 79-990(JTC» (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1985); Light, When EPA Makes a 
Superfund Mistake: Judicial Review Under Superfund, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10,148, 10,153 (1987). 
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menting a CERCLA cleanup and associated costs it alleges to have 
incurred, except for "proof that the implemented cleanup was con-
sistent with the response action selected by the EPA and that the 
claimed costs were actually incurred."170 According to its fully 
evolved interpretation of section 107(a)(4)(B), 171 Congress "removed 
the myriad of implementation decisions made during the course of a 
response action from the purview of judicial review."172 
The government's behavior in this area bears all the hallmarks of 
a litigator coming late to a position on a legal issue. The very stat-
utory language that the EPA and the DOJ drafted for the 1986 
amendments is the starting point for defendants' analysis that 
Congress did not intend record review to apply in injunctive relief 
cases. The DOJ argues that SARA's record review provision 
should be applied retroactively to pre-SARA cases because 
SARA merely "clarified" prior law. If one takes the DOJ seriously, 
however, before the clarification it too "misunderstood" the applic-
able law. 
Given these peculiarities, it is easy to see why some courts have 
been less than overwhelmed by the logic of the government's ret-
roactive record review position. Nevertheless, even here the gov-
ernment has made considerable progress in the district courts. In 
United States v. Rohm & Haas Co. ,173 for example, the court agreed 
with the government that provisions of the statute establishing an 
administrative record review regime should apply retroactively.174 
Finding that the government had not followed the new procedures 
specified in SARA, however, the court remanded the case to the 
EPA for a "retroactive" creation of a record under SARA's stan-
dards. 175 Other courts have gone far to curb the availability of dis-
covery on remedy issues in CERCLA cost-recovery cases, which is 
the principal strategic advantage of record review for the govern-
ment. 176 The extent to which the courts will adopt the government's 
judicial review preclusion approach on cost issues remains open at 
170 See Memorandum in Support of United States' Second Motion for a Protective Order at 
20, United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260 (D. Mass. 1988) (Nos. 
85-2463-WD, 85-2714-WD) [hereinafter Charles George Gov't Memo.]. 
171 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). 
172 Charles George Gov't Memo., supra note 170, at 5. 
173 669 F. Supp. 672 (D. N.J. 1987). 
174 Id. at 677. 
175 Id. at 684. 
176 E.g., United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 743-44 (W.D. Mich. 
1987), aff'd, United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 1527 (1990). 
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this writing, the new theory having been offered for the first time 
in 1988. 
IV. TEXTUAL CRITICISM OF THE "CLARIFIED" REGIME 
By 1990, the government had fully developed its legal position on 
how SARA clarified and confirmed the 1980 Act on the issues dis-
cussed above. As to liability, the government viewed SARA as 
clarifying and confirming the standard of strict, joint and several, 
retroactive liability without proof of causation, no matter how min-
imal a defendant's contribution to the harm. Now, joint and several 
liability must be applied except when a defendant can prove that the 
harm and threat of harm caused by that particular defendant was 
clearly separate from the harm caused by other defendants. 
As to contribution, the government evolved a position that defen-
dants generally may bring claims seeking contribution in the gov-
ernment's enforcement action. Such contribution claims should be 
severed, however, or at least deferred for separate trial until after 
judgment or settlement could be reached between the government 
and those defendants whom it chose to sue. In the government's 
view, the policy of the statute ranks quick recovery for the Super-
fund above the equity evident in deferring final judgment until each 
defendant's equitable share of the liability is known. Similarly, the 
statute values full recovery for the Superfund over the equity of 
adjusting the government's recovery against non-settlors when there 
has been a demonstrable "sweetheart deal" between the government 
and favored parties. 
As to judicial review, similar efficiency imperatives govern. Judi-
cial review of the government's position on appropriate response 
actions has been deferred until the government chooses to bring an 
enforcement suit. A defendant may not even sue after the govern-
ment's response action has been completed. Moreover, judicial re-
view of the response decision has been limited to the administrative 
record, no matter when or how that record was assembled or 
whether the government was seeking the court's exercise of its 
injunction powers or merely assessing the extent of the govern-
ment's recovery of incurred costs. Once the government's response 
decision is upheld on the administrative record, no further review 
of costs or activities implementing the response decision is ever 
available, no matter how high or apparently unreasonable the ex-
penses. All of these results are for the sake of efficient and expedi-
tious cleanup and cost recovery. 
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Whatever the desirability of the CERCLA regime that the gov-
ernment has advocated so successfully, its judicial achievements 
have come at considerable sacrifice to the statute's text. Both the 
text of the original Act and the text of the amendments, which clarify 
and confirm the original Act according to the government, have been 
manipulated to support a pro-government interpretation. Novel in-
terpretation or studied ignorance of the text has been necessary to 
achievement of the government's policy goals. There are numerous 
examples. A few of the more prominent ones are provided below. 
A. Liability: "Such" and "Or" 
To begin, there are two liability issues arising under statutory 
language that was not changed by the SARA amendments. Section 
107(a)(3) brings "generators" within the class of persons potentially 
liable under the statute. This group includes any person who within 
the terms of the statute -
arranged for disposal . . . of hazardous substances . . . at any 
facility . . . containing such hazardous substances . . . from 
which there is a release ... of a hazardous substance. 177 
A key word in this definition that the courts have construed to relax 
any requirement for causation under the statute is "such." CERCLA 
defendants have interpreted the word "such" as a referent to haz-
ardous substances mentioned earlier in the sentence. Thus, the gov-
ernment must prove that the hazardous substances found at the site 
are those for which the defendant arranged disposal. 
In the mid-1980s, however, the government convinced the courts 
otherwise. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' explanation follow-
ing the government's construction is typical. Citing the first of sev-
eral definitions for "such" in Black's Law Dictionary, the court laid 
out the proposition that the phrase "such hazardous substances" 
denotes hazardous substances alike, similar, or of a like kind to those 
that were present in a generator defendant's waste or that could 
have been produced by the mixture of the defendant's waste with 
other waste present at the site. Thus, absent proof that a generator 
defendant's specific waste remained at a facility at the time of re-
lease, a showing of chemical similarity between hazardous sub-
stances is sufficient. 178 
177 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)-(4) (1988) (emphasis added). 
178 United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 1988). 
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There is little to support this construction of the term "such" in 
CERCLA's legislative history. In 1980, the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works had considered the phrase "any other 
person who caused or contributed to or is causing or contributing to 
such ... release" to be too broad. 179 The language of section 107(a)(3) 
appears to have been included in the statute in order to narrow, not 
to expand, the class of potentially liable "generators." 
The construction also creates logical difficulties. Read literally 
with this interpretation of "such," any person who arranges for 
disposal of a substance at a facility is liable for cleanup of the facility, 
whether their waste ever went to the facility at all. The courts solved 
this difficulty by inferring a requirement that the generator's waste 
must be "sent" to the site needing cleanup.180 There is no textual 
basis for this judicially-created element of the government's prima 
facie case. 
Moreover, it was unnecessary for the courts to strain grammar 
and settled principles of statutory construction to achieve the policy 
objective sought by the government through its interpretation of 
"such." All that was needed was a decision to allow the government 
to meet its burden of proof that a defendant's waste was contained 
at the site. Absent direct proof regarding the removal of the defen-
dant's particular waste from the facility, the government could meet 
this burden upon a showing that waste similar to that of the defen-
dant's was at the site. This further relaxation of section 107(a)(3) 
sacrificed the text, as well as logic, to the policy objective. 
Another early example of the government's unnecessary straining 
of the statutory text involves its advocacy of a stringent joint and 
several liability standard. In the South Carolina Recycling district 
court opinion drafted by the government, the court misread Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts section 443A to state that joint and 
several liability may be avoided only "[i]f the harm is divisible and 
there is a reasonable basis for apportionment. "181 The Restatement 
179 H.R. REP. No. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071(a) (1980) reprinted in A Legislative 
History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980 at 438 (cited in Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 170 n.17). Ironically, some courts have read this 
history in an opposite way. Having examined the legislative history of the 1980 House bill, 
which clearly required causation to establish liability, and finding that the Senate did not 
adopt the House's language in the "compromise" that became law, some courts conclude that 
the Senate intended to omit any causation requirement. E.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 170 n.17; 
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). 
180 Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 169 n.15. 
181 United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 994 
(D.S.C., 1984) (citing United States v. Chern-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983)). 
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section uses the disjunctive "or," not the conjunctive "and," which 
negates joint and several liability where the harm is not "single" or 
where there is a "reasonable basis for apportionment of a single 
harm. "182 
Only when pressed on the point in the South Carolina Recycling 
appeal did the government abandon its prior position that C hem-
Dyne required both physically separate harms and a "reasonable 
basis" to avoid joint and several liability in any context. Neverthe-
less, it continued to push for the disjunctive in the district courts, 
and at times was successful. For example, the district court in 
Stringfellow held that joint and several liability could be avoided 
only "if there are distinct harms that are capable of division. "183 
Again, as demonstrated in the Fourth Circuit's and First Circuit's 
affirmances of their respective district courts' grants of partial sum-
mary judgment on liabilitY,I84 such strained construction of the Res-
tatement was unnecessary because of the difficulty of any defen-
dant's showing that a simple indicator such as volume can serve as 
a reasonable basis for apportionment of a single harm. In Monsanto, 
generator defendants had not even attempted a showing that their 
advocated volumetric apportionment was a reasonable basis for ap-
portionment of the harm. 185 In O'Neil, defendants also apparently 
failed to make a sufficient showing. 186 
B. Contribution: "Any Person" and "Potential Liability" 
The government's interpretation of SARA's contribution provi-
sion, section 113(f), further evidences the government's loose treat-
ment of the statutory text in pursuit of its policy objectives. Section 
113(f) provides that, "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any 
other person who is liable or potentially liable" under the statute. 187 
Like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a), which provides for im-
pleader, section 113(f) provides for the acceleration of contribution 
claims at the option of the defendant-contribution plaintiff. ISS Follow-
182 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965). 
183 United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 
184 See supra notes 128-136 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text. 
186 O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 181-82 (1st Cir. 1989). 
187 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1988). 
188 See Jennings v. United States, 374 F.2d 983, 986 n.4 (4th Cir. 1967) ("[I]mpleader ... 
avoid[sl the inconvenience and expense of instituting a separate ... action.); Lumbermen's 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 410 F.2d 627, 630 (4th Cir. 1962) 
(endorsing conditional orders regarding claims asserted under Rule 14(a) that are issued before 
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ing its preference for severance of contribution claims evidenced in 
its original reauthorization proposal, however, the government suc-
cessfully argued to the Fourth Circuit that section 113(f) "unambig-
uously" vests the trial court with discretion to "decide whether 
contribution claims are more appropriately considered during or 
following the government's action under section 107."189 
Judge Widener's dissent in Monsanto is persuasive that the gov-
ernment's "plain meaning" reading of section 113(f) is not correct: 
[T]he statute plainly provides that discretion with respect to 
contribution is not in the district court to consider relief or not 
as the majority opinion holds; rather, it is in the generator to 
seek relief, for "any person" certainly includes the generators of 
the waste. So, since the matter was before the district court, 
that court had no discretion but to decide the question .... While 
I agree that the claims may be asserted in a separate action, if 
they are asserted in the main case they must be decided. 190 
As with the liability issues discussed above, the government's 
violence to the statutory language, here in the form of construing 
"any person" to mean "the court," is largely unnecessary. The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, which expressly govern CERCLA 
contribution actions,191 provide that a trial court may bifurcate its 
decision on issues of liability and contribution into separate phases 
of the same proceeding. 192 The court may even sever contribution 
claims and render final judgment on the government's case when it 
makes the express determinations required by Rule 54(b)-"that 
there is no just reason for delay."193 Given the Senate Judiciary 
Committee's rejection of the government's more extreme position 
advocated in the Congress, it is far from obvious why the govern-
ment has chosen in litigation to go beyond the authority of the 
Federal Rules. It nevertheless has done so successfully at some cost 
to the statutory text. 
The violence to the statutory text wrought by the government's 
construction of CERCLA's contribution protection provision is con-
siderably more subtle. CERCLA's legislative history does little to 
substantive contribution rights arise); cf. 3 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, & J. WICKER, MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.08 (2d ed. 1987) (contribution claims are accelerated under Rule 
14(a)). 
189 DOJ Monsanto Brief, supra note 139, at 9. 
190 United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173 (4th Cir. 1988) (Widener, J., dis-
senting). 
191 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). 
192 FED. R. CIV. P. 42. 
193 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
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explain the changes to section 113(f)(2) and 113(f)(3)(A) discussed 
above. 194 Apparently, however, Congress made these changes to 
eliminate any implication that the size of the government's claim 
against non-settlors would be governed exclusively by the terms of 
an earlier partial settlement. 195 Settlement reduces "potentialliabil-
ity" of non-settlors, not the actual "claim." 
Thus, liability must be reduced at least by the amount of the 
settlement, but may be less than the balance should the court find 
the non-settlors' equitable shares to be less than the shares that the 
settlement contemplated. Accordingly, a CERCLA plaintiff's action 
against non-settlors is not necessarily for "the remainder of the relief 
sought" after settlement because the plaintiff's claim may be reduced 
by an amount in excess of the settlement amount. As in the earlier 
partial settlements, the government would thus bear the risk of a 
sweetheart deal by having its judgment reduced accordingly. 196 
The government's principal basis to avoid these plausible inter-
pretations of the changes to section 113(f) rests on a confused gloss 
on the changes found in Senator Stafford's floor statement on the 
day the Senate Judiciary Committee's amendments were introduced. 
Senator Stafford explained that the phrase "the remainder of the 
relief sought" had been deleted to avoid redundancy. He stated, "It 
is unnecessary to repeat the phrase .... To do so would be redundant 
and therefore surplusage."197 Even though Senator Stafford offered 
the Judiciary Committee's amendments at Senator Thurmond's re-
quest and the amendments became a part of the Senate bill by 
unanimous consent, Stafford previously had opposed them. 198 The 
EPA and the DOJ had a role in drafting Senator Stafford's state-
ment. 
C. Judicial Review: "Within" and "All Costs" 
The area of judicial review of the EPA CERCLA decisions also 
provides some basis to question the textual interpretations that the 
government had been advocating. For example, the amendments to 
the administrative order regime were made in order to eliminate the 
194 See supra notes 77-79, 149-151 and accompanying text. 
195 See Letter from Carol T. Crawford, supra note 141, at 2 (fourth question from Grassley). 
196 See Light, supra note 150, at 660. 
197 131 CONGo REC. Sl1,855 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Stafford). 
198 See Letter from Senator Stafford to Senator Thurmond (June 24, 1985) (disclosing 
Stafford's personal opposition to the amendments which he subsequently introduced at Thur-
mond's request) (available in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review offices). 
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Aminoil-type infirmity resulting from the absence of a meaningful 
administrative hearing prior to issuance of the order. 199 The govern-
ment, however, has interpreted the reimbursement provision to au-
thorize judicial review only after completion of the response action, 
followed by completion of a detailed administrative review process. 200 
If this construction of section 106(b )(2)201 is correct, it may not serve 
to eliminate the due process problem because post-completion review 
may not meet the Supreme Court's standard of review "at a mean-
ingful time and in a meaningful manner for purposes of constitutional 
due process. "202 
The language in section 106(b)(2) is somewhat ambiguous. Logi-
cally, a petition for reimbursement should be available to an order 
recipient upon commencement of a response in compliance with the 
order. That is, the words of the provision "within 60 days after 
completion"203 could mean "not beyond 60 days after completion. "204 
The government, however, interprets the provision to mean "inside 
the limits of 60 days after completion,"205 thus requiring that the 
remedy order be completed prior to petition for any reimburse-
ment.206 The government apparently never has considered the first 
construction, even though that construction is more likely to avoid 
the potential due process problem and to encourage compliance with 
section 106 orders, the purposes of the provision. 
The government has taken a hard line interpretation of the phrase 
"[a]ny person who receives and complies with the terms of any order" 
to mean that a person must have finished all the tasks called for by 
the order before petitioning for reimbursement. 207 A person who has 
received an order and is in the process of complying with it may not 
petition for reimbursement, no matter how costly that compliance. 
Having expended millions of dollars in compliance with an order it 
believes invalid, a recipient still may not petition for reimbursement 
199 See 131 CONGo REC. S11,857 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985) (Statement of Sen. Thurmond) 
("In an attempt to avoid a possible constitutional problem, section 106 is amended to include 
a good-faith defense to penalties under that section."). 
200 See Chicago Steel & Pickling Corp. v. Bush, 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1040, 1042 (N.D. 
Ill. 1989); Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 709 F. Supp. 249, 252-53 (D.D.C. 1989). 
201 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2) (1988). 
202 See also discussion of pre-enforcement review cases, supra notes 80-84, 153-176 and 
accompanying text. 
2tl3 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(A) (1988). 
204 WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1634 (2d. College ed. 1981). 
206 Id. . 
206 See Chicago Steel & Pickling Corp. v. Bush, 31 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1040, 1042 (N.D. 
Ill. 1989); Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 709 F. SUpp. 249, 252-53 (D.D.C. 1989). 
207 See Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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of any expenses so long as tasks remain. This largely eliminates the 
utility of the reimbursement provision for long-term and costly re-
medial actions. 
Moreover, the statutory language on the retroactivity of the pro-
vision also offers little in support of the government's conclusion that 
reimbursement was intended to be prospective only. The govern-
ment has argued successfully that numerous other aspects of the 
SARA amendments are retroactive, including the award of pre-
judgment interest,208 the waiver of the states' eleventh amendment 
sovereign immunity,209 and other statutory definitions. Retroactive 
"record review" is another prominent example, appearing in the 
same section 113 as SARA's cost recovery statute of limitations, a 
provision the government contends is prospective only.210 Appar-
ently, the DOJ only views provisions that are adverse to the gov-
ernment's financial interest, such as application of SARA's cost re-
covery statute of limitations and the reimbursement provision, as 
prospective only. The incongruity in the government's retroactivity 
positions under CERCLA on the record review and statute of limi-
tations issues is revealed in the following passage from a government 
brief arguing for a prospective-only statute of limitations: 
The United States has argued elsewhere that CERCLA Sec-
tion 113G), not in issue here, should be applied to all pending 
cases because the amendment contained in SARA merely clari-
fies CERCLA's original intent to confine review of EPA remedial 
decisions to the administrative record. However, in U.S. v. Har-
dage . .. and U.S. v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., ... the Courts held 
that CERCLA Section 113G) as amended by SARA, should not 
be applied "retroactively" in those cases .... Whether this Court 
adopts the reasoning of Chevron [Oil Co. v. Huson] [refusing to 
apply court decisions retroactively to avoid unfairness] and Brad-
ley [v. City of Richmond] [applying procedural decisions retro-
actively] or Hardage, it should decline to apply CERCLA Section 
113(g)(2)(A) [the statute of limitations] retroactively .... 211 
There is an obvious inconsistency between this brief, endorsing the 
rationales of the Hardage and Ottati & Goss courts, and the prior 
government briefs opposing the positions adopted by the courts. 
208 United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1505-06 (6th Cir. 1989), eert. denied, 
110 S. Ct. 1527 (1990). 
209 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas & Elec. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989). 
210 The United States' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
at 9-10, United States v. Moore, 703 F. Supp. 455 (E.D. Va. January 25, 1988) (No. 87-101-
NN) (citations omitted). 
211 [d. 
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Despite the obvious sacrifice of consistency, the majority of courts 
have so far given the government the best of both worlds on retroac-
tivity matters under the statute. 
A few courts have gone the next step to adopt the government's 
most recent extension of its judicial review position. Its legal argu-
ment in support of eliminating discovery on costs and implementation 
issues-that CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(A) requires this result-has 
no textual basis.212 CERCLA section 107(a) provides, in relevant 
part, that the present owner and operator, past owners or operators, 
generators, and transporters associated with a facility -
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which 
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous sub-
stance, shall be liable for ... (A) all costs of removal or remedial 
action incurred by the United States Government or a State not 
inconsistent with the national contingency plan. 213 
The government reads this "plain language" to confine judicial re-
view of implementation decisions and costs incurred under the stat-
ute as "proof that the response action was performed, and that the 
claimed costs were actually incurred."214 There is nothing in CER-
CLA's plain language, however, to suggest that the statute intends 
to preclude judicial inquiry into implementation decisions and costs 
in a cost recovery action. At a minimum, the language falls far short 
of the "showing of 'clear and convincing evidence of a ... legislative 
intent' to restrict access to judicial review. "215 
First, the plain language of section 107(a)(4)(A) indicates that only 
certain costs may be recovered, namely costs that are "not inconsis-
tent with the national contingency plan" (NCP), CERCLA's govern-
ing regulation. 216 The quoted phrase plainly modifies the word 
"costS."217 Effect must be given every word, clause, and sentence of 
a statute, and each word must be assumed to have a purpose.218 Had 
Congress intended that the government could recover all incurred 
expenditures so long as it performed a cleanup, it would have said 
so. The statute does not use the term "perform a cleanup" in section 
212 See infra notes 213-247 and accompanying text. 
213 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
214 Clw,rles George Gov't Memo., supra note 170, at 5, 7-10. 
216 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967), quoted in Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
216 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). 
217 See id. 
218 United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 
107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882». 
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107(a)(4)(A) as it does elsewhere.219 The EPA and the DOJ actually 
are trying to excise a limiting phrase in the section that they find 
inconvenient. Neither the executive nor the courts may rewrite 
statutory language. 220 
Second, CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(A) only allows the government 
to recover costs of "removal or remedial action. "221 Many activities 
fall within these statutory definitions only under limited conditions. 
For example, "removal" included "[1] actions . . . necessary . . . in 
the event of the threat of release . . . , [2] such actions as may be 
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of 
release . . . , or [3] the taking of such other actions as may be 
necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage. "222 Whether 
costs incurred by the government fall within these general categories 
as costs of "removal" depends upon whether they are "necessary." 
Thus, even if the phrase "not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan" were excised from the statute, when the cost of an 
activity is not a cost "as may be necessary" within the definitional 
language, it may not be recoverable because it is not a cost of 
"removal or remedial action. "223 
Third, the government may not excise the further express require-
ment in CERCLA section 107(a) that the plaintiff prove that the 
alleged release or threatened release causes the incurrence of the 
costs sought to be recovered.224 The costs of many activities, like 
the erection of a fence, mayor may not be incurred in response to 
a release of a hazardous substance. If incurred for other reasons, 
such expenses may not be recovered under CERCLA.225 
219 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(2)(C) (1988). 
220 See Menasche, 348 U.S. at 538--39. 
221 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). 
222 [d. § 9601(23) (1988) (emphasis added). 
223 Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 651 (3d Cir. 
1988). The United States argued that judicial review of the necessity of response costs incurred 
under CERCLA is available only when the persons incurring the costs are proceeding under 
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) because the word "necessary" precedes "response costs" in that 
subparagraph but not in the prior subparagraph at issue here. Charles George Gov't Memo., 
supra note 170, at 18. Assuming arguendo that Congress intended a different standard to 
apply because of the use of this adjective, the effect would be to extend the necessity 
requirement to all categories of response costs, both removal and remedial, under CERCLA 
§ 107(a)(4)(B), as the United States implicitly suggests, to strike the necessity requirement 
from the "removal" definition where the term appears. An activity always must be either a 
"removal or remedial action" before its costs are recoverabie. 
224 See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985), afl'd in part 
and vacated in part, 900 F.2d 429 (lst Cir. 1990); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 
1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
225 Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 795 (D. N.J. 1989); 
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In its briefs, the government self-consciously confuses the issue 
of burden of proof with the availability of judicial review. The gov-
ernment emphasizes decisions holding that defendants have the bur-
den under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(A)226 of showing that costs are 
"inconsistent with the national contingency plan" in order to avoid 
reimbursing those costS.227 There is nothing in these decisions to 
suggest that the statute contemplates preclusion of inquiry into or 
discovery of evidence relevant to inconsistency with the national 
contingency plan. To the contrary, prior judicial opinions in CER-
CLA cost recovery cases indicate that there should be careful judicial 
inquiry into the government's incurrence of specific costs and its 
reasons for allocating alleged costs to a particular release. 228 
The government's "plain language" argument thus comes down to 
its assertion that inclusion of the term "all costs" and absence of the 
term "reasonable" in CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(A) precludes dis-
covery into the reasonableness, prudence, efficiency, or cost-effec-
tiveness of the costs it alleges to have incurred in response to the 
release of hazardous substances at a Superfund site. This assertion 
is based on a paragraph in the Eighth Circuit's decision in United 
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. (NE-
PACCO),229 stating that costs "not inconsistent with the NCP are 
conclusively presumed to be reasonable. CERCLA does not refer to 
'all reasonable costs' but simply to 'all costs. "'230 
This citation is arguably inapt. In NEPACCO, the Eighth Circuit 
was considering the issue of who had the burden of proof on whether 
see Pennsylvania Urban Dev. Corp. v. Golen, 708 F. Supp. 669, 671-72 (E.D. Pa. 1989); City 
of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 620 (E.D.N. Y. 1986). 
226 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). 
227 Charles George Gov't Memo., supra note 170, at 9-10. 
228 See, e.g., Ottati & Goss, 694 F. Supp. at 987-97. 
229 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). 
230 [d. at 748. In Charles George Gov't Memo., supra note 170, at 14 n.ll, the government 
also suggests that United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. 410 (W.D. Mich. 
1988), a/I'd sub nom., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1527 (1990), supports its preclusion position. The Northernaire court, 
however, examined the specific allegations presented by the defendants, and affidavits sub-
mitted by the EPA, before resolving disputes based on the specific facts presented. The 
government's citation of the case to the contrary notwithstanding, the Northernaire court 
actually held that agency litigation and related activities did not merit the deferential review 
applied to "the agencies' choice of cleanup remedy." 685 F. Supp. at 1417. On the government's 
motion for summary judgment, however, the defendants failed to raise genuine issues of 
material fact as to the cost-effectiveness of the EPA's response decisions that they had 
previously challenged in a conclusory way. The Northernaire court expressly noted in its 
decision granting the government's motion for summary judgment that "there are no discovery 
disputes pending in this case." [d. at 1414. 
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a cleanup action is "necessary" or "cost-effective. "231 The court found 
these matters to be encompassed in the determination of consistency 
or inconsistency with the NCP.232 It therefore found that the burden 
of proof on the issues normally rests on the defendant in actions by 
the United States because of the phrase "not inconsistent."233 The 
court likewise considered the reasonableness of costs to be subsumed 
in the "consistency" issue under this statutory language. No separate 
reasonableness requirement exists, so defendants normally have the 
burden to prove that costs are unreasonable with reference to their 
inconsistency with the NCP.234 
The NEPACCO defendants had not challenged the reasonableness 
of specific alleged costs, but relied instead on their legal argument 
that the burden of proof regarding the necessity and reasonableness 
of the government's costs was on the government. The court rejected 
that burden of proof argument. It is questionable, however, whether 
the Eighth Circuit intended to imply that it would have ignored 
material evidence regarding the unreasonableness of costs had the 
defendants mounted such challenges. 235 
The government has argued that the NCP "does not govern the 
incurrence of costs in implementing response actions."236 The gov-
ernment's lengthy analysis of the NCP in its United States v. Charles 
George Trucking Co. brief emphasizes that "[t]here are simply no 
provisions in the NCP which furnish criteria for determining what 
types of costs may be incurred by the EPA or how costs are to be 
evaluated. "237 The government draws the wrong conclusion from this 
analysis. No court ever has suggested that the government can avoid 
inquiry into the necessity, cost-effectiveness, or reasonableness of 
its activities and expenditures by failing to promulgate regulations 
addressing those three criteria. 
Indeed the NEPACCO court noted that whether a particular re-
sponse action is necessary is "factored jnto the 'cost-effectiveness' 
equation" under the NCP and thus is judicially reviewable in that 
231 United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 
726, 747 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
232 Id. at 747-48. 
233 Id. at 747. 
234 Id. at 748. 
235 Such a result would be absurd. A court may not construe a statute in this manner. See 
Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2565-66 (1989) (quoting 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892». 
236 Charles George Gov't Memo., supra note 170, at 12. 
237 I d. at 16. 
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framework. 238 The EPA's failure to promulgate regulations thus 
should mean that there can be no presumption of reasonableness on 
implementation and cost issues because the NCP has failed to set 
out a procedure for an agency to create the presumption of reason-
ableness. Subsequent to its NEPACCO decision, the Eighth Circuit 
noted in Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA239 that the burden of proof 
on an issue under such circumstances is shifted to the government 
until regulations are promulgated. 240 
Nevertheless, the first court of appeals to address this set of issues 
suggested that the government may, in fact, achieve the result it 
seeks, even if the court has not adopted in toto the rationale the 
government has manufactured. In United States v. R.W. Meyer, 
Inc.,241 before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defen-
dants argued that certain categories of costs alleged by the govern-
ment, such as indirect costs, were not recoverable because they were 
not demonstrably allocable to the site cleanup at issue.242 The gov-
ernment, however, presented testimony concerning the mathemati-
cal formula it used to allocate indirect costs to individual Superfund 
projects. 243 Even though no CERCLA regulation embodied the for-
mula, the court found the "internal policy guidance" outlining the 
formula to be reasonable and a sufficient basis for allowing recovery 
of such costs in the case before it. 244 
Prior to the 1986 amendments, courts interpreting CERCLA al-
ways had assumed that specific costs were judicially reviewable and 
238 NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 748. 
239 Solid State Circuits v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987). 
240 I d. at 392. The court held that the burden of proof shifts to the government where 
CERCLA "is silent or ambiguous, and the EPA has failed to promulgate regulations or to 
issue position statements that could allow a party to weigh in advance the probability that 
the clean-up order is valid or applicable." Id. The Department of Justice argued in litigation 
prior to 1988 that cost issues were reviewable de novo and not subject to review of an 
administrative record. See Light, When EPA Makes a Superfund Mistake: Judicial Review 
Problems Under SARA, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,148, 10,154 (1987) (citing 
United States' Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Occidental Chemical Cor-
poration's Motion to Compel Production of Documents Withheld by New York on the Basis 
of Deliberative Privilege at 3 n.4, United States v. Occidental Chern. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 
1470 (W.D.N. Y. 1985) (No. 79-990(JTC». In the Thomas Solvent brief, the government 
acknowledged that it has now changed its legal position. See Light, Why the Facts Have 
Become Relevant: The Outer Bounds of Superfund Liability, in POLLUTION LIABILITY: STRAT-
EGIES FOR MANAGING THE COMBINED CHALLENGES OF SUPERFUND AND TOXIC TORT CLAIMS 
35, 37 (C. Poirier & J. Mosher ed. 1988). 
241 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989). 
242 I d. at 1502. 
243 See id. at 1503-04. 
244 See id. 
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that the EPA never could recover "unjustified" costs in an action 
under CERCLA section 107.245 Nothing in the 1986 amendments or 
their legislative history suggests that Congress has ever had a dif-
ferent view. Indeed, the government in its own testimony during 
the reauthorization process continually affirmed that, following en-
actment of the proposed "judicial review" amendments to CERCLA 
section 113, "responsible parties will still be able to establish that 
the [National Contingency] Plan was not followed or that specific 
costs were not proper. "246 
The R. W. Meyer court, however, allowed the recovery of costs 
not directly allocable to a Superfund project as "response costs," 
even though the allocation method was not included in the NCP.247 
Nevertheless, the EPA's default in promulgating any regulations 
concerning such implementation requirements and the allocation of 
costs did not shift the burden of proof to the government to establish 
the necessity and appropriateness of its implementation decisions 
and costs in individual cost recovery actions, as the Eighth Circuit 
had intimated in Solid State Circuits. 
A final, probably unanticipated, "construction" of SARA's judicial 
review preclusion provisions involving citizen suits merits discus-
sion. In the House Judiciary Committee's version of SARA, the 
statute's citizen suit provision stated that "[s]uch an action may be 
maintained during the course of construction and implementation of 
the remedial action, where the person bringing the action alleges 
that the specific remedial measures being taken are in violation of 
this Act. "248 Environmentalists sought this addition so that citizen 
suits would be available at a meaningful time for those protesting a 
remedy that the EPA had selected and proposed to implement. 249 
245 See, e.g., Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Section 
9607 provides an adequate opportunity for the alleged responsible parties to object to cost 
and adequacy of response actions. "); J. V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 
1985) (costs must not be inconsistent with NCP); United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 
466 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (government's failure to take prompt action and other failures to be 
"considered in mitigation of any damages"); Industrial Park Dev. Co. v. EPA, 604 F. Supp. 
1136, 1144 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (the EPA is not permitted to impose unjustified costs). 
246 Superfund Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 66, at 61 (statement of F. Henry 
Habicht III, DOJ Assistant Attorney General, Law and Natural Resources Division). 
247 See 889 F.2d at 1503-04. 
248 H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, at 4 (1985) (proposed CERCLA 
§ 113(i)(4» (emphasis added). 
249 See Current Developments, Hazardous Waste, House Panel Votes to Allow Citizens to 
Sue to Force Dumpers to Clean Up Sites, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 892 (Sept. 20, 1985) ("Envi-
ronmentalists lobbied hard for the citizen suit provision .... "). 
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The House Judiciary Committee's Report, however, "explained" the 
provision as follows: 
The Judiciary Committee amendment modified new subsection 
113(i)(4), as reported by the Energy and Commerce Committee, 
to clarify the right of persons to seek review of response actions 
under the new citizens suit provisions of CERCLA, which would 
be established by this Act (Section 207 of H. R. 2817, new Section 
310 of CERCLA). With this modification, persons may seek 
review of remedial action (not removal actions) during construc-
tion and implementation of such actions when a specific remedial 
measure that has been constructed is allegedly in violation of a 
requirement of this Act. 250 
Beginning in the House Judiciary Committee Report and continu-
ing in subsequent legislative history offered on the floors of the 
House and Senate at the time the Conference Report was accepted, 
Representative Glickman set forth the government's position that 
"taken" means "completed" and therefore that no judicial review of 
the EPA remedial actions was to be available except for remedial 
actions that have been taken. 251 Thus, affected citizens may obtain 
review only of remedial actions that already have been completed. 
In other words, review is available after it is effectively too late to 
change the decision that citizens allege to be erroneous. 
The sentence added by the House Judiciary Committee created a 
logical problem with this construction because the provision would 
allow for review of a measure being completed, a concept at war 
with the government's objective to avoid review until after comple-
tion. Somehow, however, the troubling language dropped by the 
wayside on its way to the House floor, for the "compromise" mark-
up vehicle accepted by the relevant House committees did not con-
tain it.252 Thus, there was less of a linguistic problem with the 
committee report's construction of "taken," which Representative 
Glickman repeated on the floor of the House. 253 Although the Con-
ference Report was more equivocal on the meaning of "taken," leg-
islators supporting the government's position dutifully recited the 
"taken" equals "completed" rationale at the time the report was 
accepted. 254 Not even the detailed "reply brief" of Senator Stafford 
250 H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3, at 23 (1985) (emphasis added). 
251 [d.; 132 CONGo REC. H9583 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986); 131 CONGo REC. Hll,084 (daily ed. 
Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Glickman). 
252 See 131 CONGo REC. Hll,084 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Glickman). 
253 [d. 
254 132 CONGo REC. H9583 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Glickman); 132 CONGo 
REC. S14,929 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
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on the matter could overcome the government's "floor state-
ments. "255 
V. CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF "BEING TAKEN" 
This final example dramatically demonstrates the sort of post-hoc 
legislative history to which the federal courts have so often resorted 
in construing CERCLA.256 They have not done so willingly. In its 
first opportunity to construe a provision of the Act, the Supreme 
Court in a classic understatement found CERCLA to be "not a model 
of legislative draftsmanship. "257 The lower courts occasionally have 
been less gentle, variously finding the Act to have "less than perfect" 
draftsmanship with a "slimmer" than usual legislative history,258 to 
have been "hastily assembled" with a "fragmented legislative his-
torY,"259 or, more commonly, to have a "well-deserved notoriety for 
vaguely drafted revisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, 
legislative history. "260 One frustrated district court judge recently 
commented, "It astounds this Court that a statute as important as 
CERCLA is to the protection of our environment and the public 
health remains as inscrutable as ever. "261 Frequently judicial com-
ments have approached the satire which Representative Harsha 
predicted in 1980,262 finding that "Congress did not, to say the least, 
255 See 132 CONGo REC. S17,316 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986). Senator Stafford and Represen-
tatives Florio and Roe provided the "counter" legislative history provided by environmental-
ists. 132 CONGo REC. H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Roe) ("The legislation 
allows citizens to bring a lawsuit under section 310 as soon as the agency announces its decision 
regarding how a cleanup will be structured. A final cleanup decision, or plan, constitutes the 
taking of action at a site .... "); 132 CONGo REC. S14,898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement 
of Sen. Stafford) ("It is crucial, if it is at all possible, to maintain citizens' rights to challenge 
response actions, or final cleanup plans, before such plans are implemented .... "). 
256 See Schalk V. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990); Alabama V. EPA, 871 F.2d 
1548, 1557-58 (11th Cir.), eert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 538 (1989); Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup 
Emergency V. Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828, 832--34 (D. N.J. 1989). 
257 Exxon Corp. V. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363 (1986); see also 132 CONGo REC. H9573 (daily 
ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (Rep. Snyder makes reference to this Supreme Court characterization and 
to Rep. Harsha's critical comments on the House floor in 1980). 
258 Hopkins v. Elano Corp., 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1782, 1785 (S.D. Ohio 1989). 
259 United States V. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,204 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
260 Violet V. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (D.R.I. 1986) (quoting United States V. Mottolo, 
605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985»; see also Amoco Oil CO. V. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 
670 (5th Cir. 1989) (legislative history "bereft of discussion" relevant to question presented); 
id. at 667 (because CERCLA "was enacted as a 'last minute compromise' between three 
competing bills, it has 'acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and 
an indefinite, if not contradictory legislative history.'''). 
261 In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 716 F. Supp. 676, 681 n.6 
(D. Mass. 1989). 
262 126 CONGo REC. 31,970 (1980), reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COM-
PREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 
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leave the floodlights on to illuminate the trail to the intended mean-
ing,"263 and that conflicts in sponsors' interpretations of the statute 
are "[a]lways a big help. "264 
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence of CERCLA 
Given the peculiarity of CERCLA's original legislative genesis, 
one might have predicted that federal judges interpreting the statute 
would have opted for the English perspective on legislative history 
and refused to give any credence at all to the confused legislative 
debates and proceedings.265 Justice Scalia is an apostle of what crit-
ical academicians now call "the new textualism. "266 He has become 
extremely skeptical, if not cynical, about legislative history materials 
other than the statutory text. 267 In the Supreme Court, this view 
has had considerable force in its construction of CERCLA. 
In Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,268 the Court construed the statute's 
purported preemption of aNew Jersey tax similar to the Superfund 
taxes. Declining to "attach any great significance"269 to a 1980 floor 
colloquy between New Jersey Senator Bradley and principal sponsor 
Senator Randolph, Justice Marshall gave the relevant words in the 
statute their "ordinary meaning"270 and found the New Jersey tax 
to have been partially preempted.271 Of those members of the Court 
(SUPERFUND) at 788-89 (1983) [hereinafter Legislative History]; see also 132 CONGo REC. 
H9573 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Snyder). 
263 United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 871 (D. Del. 1989). 
264 Cf. United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 571, 580 (E.D. Mich. 
1989). 
265 See Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes 
in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 277, 279-80 
(1990) [hereinafter Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper]; Wald, Some Observations on the Use of 
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 196 (1983) (citing R. 
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES 161-62 (1975); J. HURST, 
DEALING WITH STATUTES 54 (1982); de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of 
Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 545, 549 (1940); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. 
L. REV. 863, 872 (1930». 
266 See Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 n.ll (1990); Wald, The 
Sizzling Sleeper, supra note 265, at 281-82. 
267 See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-45 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189-90 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment); Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 59,59 n.l (1988). See generally Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation 
and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 87 (1984). 
268 475 U.S. 355 (1986). 
269 Id. at 373-74. 
270 Id. at 374. 
271 Id. at 376-77. 
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participating in the decision, only Justice Stevens would have cred-
ited the 1980 colloquy as the "sparse legislative history" embodying 
congressional intent and refused to find preemption.272 The decision 
has little substantive significance today, however, because the 
preemption provision that the Supreme Court interpreted in March, 
1986, was repealed in the SARA amendments in October of that 
year. 273 
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas CO.,274 the Court confronted the 
question of whether Congress intended in CERCLA to abrogate the 
eleventh amendment immunity of the states by making the states 
liable persons under the statute. 275 The decision was one among 
several during the 1988-1989 term of the Supreme Court dealing 
with the states' eleventh amendment immunity from suit in federal 
court.276 The Supreme Court previously had held that Congress only 
abrogates the states' immunity when it makes its intent "unmistak-
ably clear. "277 In a decision that could not have been more divided, 
the Court held that (1) Congress intended in the amended CERCLA 
to abrogate the states' immunity, and (2) the abrogation was consti-
tutionally valid. 278 
Only four members of the Court (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, 
and Stevens) agreed with both conclusions. In a concurring and 
dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia read CERCLA's text (as amended 
by SARA and without reference to legislative history) as calling for 
preemption but found the abrogation unconstitutional. 279 In a dis-
senting and concurring opinion, after careful analysis Justice White 
found no unmistakably clear language from which to conclude that 
Congress intended to abrogate immunity. But then in a short, one-
paragraph reversal at the conclusion of his opinion, he concurred in 
the judgment on the grounds that his "view on the statutory issue 
has not prevailed" and, while not agreeing "with much of his rea-
soning," he agreed with Justice Brennan's conclusion that abrogation 
would be constitutional. 280 
The Supreme Court's two CERCLA opinions may be viewed in 
the context of the ongoing dispute among members of the Court 
272 Id. at 379-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
273 See 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) (1988). 
274 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989). 
275 Id. at 2276-77. 
276 E.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2398 (1989). 
277 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). 
278 Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286. 
279 I d. at 2295. 
280 Id. 
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about the proper use of legislative history materials. In Union Gas, 
both Scalia and White based their constructions of the statute on its 
language, largely without reference to legislative history. This is 
consistent with these Justices' predilection to rely exclusively on the 
statutory text. 281 Justice Scalia has waxed with particular eloquence 
on the unreliability of materials other than statutory language as 
indicators of congressional intent. 282 
Other than the two cases cited above, however, so far the Supreme 
Court has refused to involve itself in the many disputes over the 
meaning of various CERCLA provisions. 283 The lower federal courts 
have had to proceed to interpret the statute in the absence of any 
guidance from the nation's highest court.284 Despite the Court's re-
cent skepticism about the uses of legislative history, the lower courts' 
approach has been rather conventional. 
B. The Snark 
To qe sure, the lower courts begin, as they must, with the statu-
tory language. 285 However, given CERCLA's gaps and ambiguities, 
frequently they turn to legislative history or other extrinsic evidence 
281 See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994, 
3003-07 (1989) (White, J.); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 
2818, 2822 (1989) (White, J.); Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 
2732, 2736 (1989) (Scalia, J.); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2121 (1989) 
(White, J.); Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2005-10 (1989) (Scalia, J.); Pittston Coal 
Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1989); see Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper, supra note 265, at 298. 
282 E.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 946-47 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) ("I am confident that only a small proportion of the Members of Congress read 
either one of the Committee Reports in question, even if (as is not always the case) the 
Reports happened to have been published before the vote .... "). 
283 See, e.g., United States v. R. W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir.), eert. denied, 110 
S. Ct. 1527 (1989); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir.), eert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1115 
(1989); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), eert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 837 (1989); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1986), 
eert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. 
Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), eert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Lone Pine Steering Comm. 
v. EPA, 777 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1985), eert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986). 
284 In the main, construction of CERCLA is exclusively the province of the federal courts, 
since all claims arising under the statute can only be resolved in federal court. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(b) (1988). 
285 United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260, 1266-67 (D. Mass. 
1988) (CERCLA § 104(e)(5) access provision is "reasonably clear"); United States v. Conser-
vation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 192, 203 (W.D. Mo. 1985) ("The starting point for the 
court's analysis must be the language of the statute itself. "). 
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of congressional intent.286 In practice, the imperfections in CER-
CLA's 1980 legislative history, as well as that of the 1986 SARA 
amendments, almost invariably have benefited the government's lit-
igation position. Where, as is frequently the case, the text is unen-
lightening, the government may bootstrap its pitch for a liberal 
interpretation on the simple argument that it is, after all, the gov-
ernment which is charged with administering the statute to be in-
terpreted.287 The argument has proven particularly useful where the 
EPA has codified or embodied its interpretation in rules under the 
Act288 or expressed its view in internal policy guidance documents. 289 
The argument's utility, however, is not limited to such situations. 290 
In the fable of the snark, the summation added up to far more 
than the witnesses had said.291 With CERCLA, no court has done a 
summation. Instead, each has limited its focus to the issues at hand, 
whether causation and joint and several liability, contribution, pre-
enforcement review, record review, or costs. The regime that has 
resulted is easily subject to reductio ad absurdum, for there are no 
established limiting principles under the regime. Let us summarize 
the government's position, which we have detailed above and which 
the courts largely have adopted. 
286 United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 898 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (in absence of clear 
statutory language, resort may be made to legislative history); State ex rei. Brown v. Geor-
geoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1309 (N.D. Ohio 1983). 
287 See Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 709 F. Supp. 249, 252 (D.D.C. 1989). The Supreme Court 
recently has counseled deference to an executive agency's construction of its own governing 
statute in several situations: (1) where a broad statutory grant was left for agency interpre-
tation, see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (statute allowing Central Intelligence 
Agency director to terminate employee when he deems it "necessary or advisable" to govern-
ment's interest "fairly exudes deference" to the agency); (2) where a single word is susceptible 
of two plausible meanings, EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) 
(deference given to agency interpretation of the word "terminate"); and (3) where an agency 
is interpreting a matter of scientific or technical complexity within the agency's special com-
petence, see Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 
125 (1985) (variances from toxic pollutant effluent limitations in the Clean Water Act); Wilshire 
Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801,809 (9th Cir. 1989) (definition of 
"hazardous substance" under CERCLA). However, the Court also has stated that "[t]he 
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administra-
tive constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). 
288 See, e.g., Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481,488 (D.C. Cir. 
1989); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 930 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
289 Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 808-10 (9th Cir. 
1989); ct. Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987). 
290 See, e.g., Wagner Seed, 709 F. Supp. at 252; Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New 
Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1290-91 (D. Del. 1987), a/I'd and remanded, 851 F.2d 643 
(3d Cir. 1988). 
291 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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Liability is strict, joint and several, and retroactive, though these 
words do not appear in the statute. 292 Strained construction of the 
adjective "such" has eliminated causation. 293 Metamorphosis of the 
disjunctive "or" to the conjunctive "and" has made the imposition of 
joint and several liability virtually automatic when wastes have be-
come commingled, no matter how slight a defendant's contribution. 294 
If a cleanup took place prior to the SARA amendments, there is not 
even an applicable statute of limitations because the limitations pe-
riod is prospective only.295 Pre-judgment interest, however, is re-
coverable retroactively. 296 
Consideration of equitable factors must await the contribution 
action. Contribution, however, may never come up, for the court 
may sever such claims and need not even decide them in a case 
where the claims properly were asserted. 297 Instead, the court may 
enter final judgments for the government without resolution of the 
related contribution claims, despite the statutory language calling 
on courts to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in contri-
bution actions under the statute. 298 
Statutory protection of sweetheart settlors is absolute. Should the 
time for contribution suit approach, the government may extinguish 
it within its prosecutorial discretion. Such governmental decisions 
to extinguish contribution claims are made without judicial review 
either during the court's evaluation of the settlement or during any 
government suit against non-settlors because the statute allows the 
government's claim to be adjusted only for the monetary settlement 
amount and not for the inequities of any alleged sweetheart deal. 299 
Absent the government's enforcement suit, a potentially respon-
sible party may not accelerate the adjudication of its liability even 
after the government response action is finished. 30o Compliance with 
292 See supra notes 25-36, 115-136 and accompanying text. 
293 See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text. 
294 See supra notes 181-186 and accompanying text. 
295 See supra notes 210-211 and accompanying text. 
296 United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. 
Ct. 1527 (1989). "Because we view SARA as reauthorizing and clarifying the congressional 
intent underlying CERCLA, because of CERCLA's retroactive application, and because of 
the broad remedial purposes underlying CERCLA and SARA, we do not believe that Congress 
would have intended SARA's prejudgment interest provisions only to have prospective effect." 
[d. 
297 See supra notes 187-193 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 194-198 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra notes 80-84, 88-101 and accompanying text. 
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a pre-SARA administrative order has even worse consequences, for 
the potentially responsible party waives its right to contest liability 
if it yields to the government's threat of daily fines and punitive 
damages. 301 And should there be an enforcement suit, the other shoe 
drops because only those protests made to the EPA in an adminis-
trative process will be heard. 302 Other protests, foregone perhaps 
because of a failure to read the legal notices in the local newspaper, 303 
can be waived for failure to participate in the administrative pro-
cess.304 
Such are the catch-22s of the Superfund regime. The sad truth is 
that judicial construction of the Superfund statute at the behest of 
the government has gone beyond both the language of the Act and 
the policies behind that language. Liability decisions have moved 
beyond the common-law principles to which Congress referred the 
courts,305 creating a regime unprecedented in American jurispru-
dence. Contribution decisions have gone beyond the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure306 to create novel bifurcation and severance prin-
ciples. 307 Judicial review of decisions have become the most extreme 
as they have neglected consideration of whether an action might, 
might not, or could not delay cleanup.308 The reSUlting preclusion 
regime furthers the convenience of the government's litigators even 
when cleanup considerations are not at stake. 
301 See supra notes 199-210. 
302 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(D) (1988) (petitioner may obtain reimbursement "to the extent 
that it can demonstrate, on the administrative record, that the ... decision ... was arbitrary 
and capricious .... " (emphasis added). 
303 See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(d) (1988); 55 Fed. Reg. 8844 (1990) (removals) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. § 300.415(m)(4)(2)); id. at 8846 (NPL deletions, but also publication in the Federal 
Register as required by APA) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(e)(4)(ii)); id. at 8851 
(remedial action selection) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(3)(A)). 
304 A few courts have questioned the constitutionality of the government's actual practice 
in providing notice and an opportunity to comment on its decision within the EPA adminis-
trative process. See United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., Nos. 85-2463-WD, 85-
2714-WD, slip op. at 1 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file 10,627) 
(remanding case to the EPA because defendants had not received notice from the EPA that 
the record was available for review and comment); United States v. Rohm and Haas Co., 669 
F. Supp. 672 (D. N.J. 1987) (remanding record to agency for additional explanation). 
305 Legislative History, supra note 262, at 686 (Sen. Randolph) ("It is intended that issues 
of liability not resolved by this Act, if any, shall be governed by traditional and evolving 
principles of common law."); id. at 778 (Rep. Florio) ("Issues of joint and several liability not 
resolved by this shall be governed by tradit.onal and evolving principles of common law. "). 
306 FED. R. Cry. P. 13, 14, 52. 
307 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
308 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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Thus far, the Supreme Court has refused to review judicial opin-
ions establishing the Superfund regime discussed herein. 309 The 
Court's opinions interpreting CERCLA have involved only periph-
eral issues. 310 It has foregone opportunities to elaborate on pre-
enforcement review preclusion and major liability and contribution 
issues.3ll There is fodder here both for the textualists and for other 
justices interested in equity. 
309 See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
310 See supra notes 268-281 and accompanying text. 
311 See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), eert. denied, 
110 S. Ct. 1527 (1990); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 
1115 (1990); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. 
Ct. 3156 (1989); Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
476 U.S. 1115 (1986). 
